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PUNITIVE ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR ABUSES OF
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
JANE P. MALLORt
As a general rule, each party to a lawsuit bears his own attorneys'
fees absent express statutory or contractual authorization for reim-
bursement. This rule, known as the American rule, has been modifled
by a number ofjudicially created exceptions, including the assessment
of "pTunitive" attorneys'fees for abuses of the judicial system. In this
article, Professor Mallor examines the threepunitive exceptions to the
American rule that are imposed for abusive litigation practices the
contempt exception, theprior litigation exception, and the badfaith ex-
ception. Proceeding from a discussion of the justfications underlying
the American rule, Professor Mallor explores the current doctrinal ele-
ments of the three punitive exceptions, and analyzes how each can be
applied to best accommodate the conflicting policies ofprotectingjudi-
cial resources and preservingfree access to the courts.
In 1796, the Supreme Court first held that attorneys' fees are not recover-
able as damages by a prevailing party.' This doctrine, which has come to be
known as the "American rule, ' 2 provides that absent express statutory or con-
tractual authorization, each party to a lawsuit bears his own attorney's fees.3
Despite recurrent scholarly criticism of the American rule,4 modern American
courts have given every indication of perpetuating the rule as a general
principle.5
At the same time, lawmakers have recognized that the reallocation or
t Associate Professor of Business Law; Indiana University School of Business. B.A. 1971,
Indiana University; J.D. 1976, Indiana University, School of Law.
1. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
2. The no-fee rule with few exceptions apparently is unique to the American legal system.
See Comment, CourtAwarded Attorney's Fees and EqualAccess to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv.
636, 637 (1974); Note, Theories of RecoveringAttorneys' Fees: Exceptions to the American Rule, 47
UMKC L. REv. 566, 591 (1979).
3. See, e.g., F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 126 (1974); Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967).
4. See, eg., Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L.
REv. 792 (1966); Kuenzel, The.4ttorney's Fees: Why Not a Cost of Litigation? 49 IowA L. REv. 75
(1963).
5. See, eg., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); F.D. Rich
Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing
Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967); Fownes v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 310 Minn. 540,246 N.W.2d 700
(1976). See also I S. SPEISER, ATTORNEY'S FEES 618 n.5 (1973) (collecting some of the "hun-
dreds" of cases affirming the American rule).
A few states, however, have enacted statutes authorizing awards of attorneys' fees to prevail-
ing parties. See ALASKA R. CIrv. P. 82 (discretionary fee shifting with fee schedule provided); OEL
REv. STAT. §§ 20.080, 20.085, 20.094,20.096 (1981) (fee shifting in specified circumstances includ-
ing tort cases in which the recovery is $3000 or less). See also WASH. REv. CODE § 4.84.010 (1962)
(discretionary awards of "expenses" to prevailing parties).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
shifting of attorneys' fees can be a powerful tool for social engineering 6 and
have created an increasing number of inroads on the American rule.7 Con-
gress has enacted an extensive array of statutes containing fee shifting provi-
sions designed to encourage private enforcement and to effectuate important
legislative policies.
8
A number of exceptions to the American rule have been created by the
courts. In divorce cases, courts frequently impose a wife's attorney's fees upon
her husband. 9 Under the "common fund" or "substantial benefit" exception,
a court will tax a claimant's attorney's fees to a common fund when the claim-
ant has created, increased, or protected a fund or right through active litiga-
tion from which others will benefit.' 0 In a short-lived outgrowth of the
common fund exception, federal courts awarded attorneys' fees to prevailing
plaintiffs who had vindicated important congressional policies under the "pri-
vate attorney general" exception," until this practice was struck down by the
Supreme Court in 1975 inAlyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.'
2
In addition to these statutorily and judicially created exceptions to the
American rule that are designed to encourage litigation and effectuate sub-
stantive legal principles, courts have created a class of exceptions designed to
protect the judicial institution by discouraging abusive litigation and litigation
practices. These exceptions are punitive in the sense that a sanction greater
than the normal permissible recovery is levied against a party because of that
party's wrongful conduct precipitating litigation or occurring during the
course of litigation. Like the doctrine of punitive damages, this sanction func-
6. See generally Note, Use of Taxable Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53 COLUM.
L. REv. 78 (1953).
7. See generally Note, Awards of Atorney's Fees in the Federal Courts, 56 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 277 (1982).
8. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976); The
Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976); The Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976); The Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976), 5 U.S.C.
§ 504 (Supp. IV 1980). For a more complete collection of federal statutes authorizing fee shifting,
see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260-61 n.33 (1975).
9. See, e.g., Foss v. Foss, 83 S.D. 574, 163 N.W.2d 354 (1968). See also McCormick, Counsel
Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element ofDamages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619, 626
(1931).
10. See McCormick, supra note 9, at 623. The taxing of attorneys' fees from the common
fund under these circumstances is not punitive, but is designed to prevent unjust enrichment. Id;
see also, e.g., Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S.
527 (1881).
11. Under the private attorney general doctrine, a prevailing plaintiff could recover his attor-
ney's fees even in the absence of statutory authorization if he had vindicated some important
federal right or statute. See, e.g., Red School House, Inc. v. OEO, 386 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Minn.
1974). See generally Comment, supra note 2, at 670-81; Note, supra note 2, at 576-81.
12. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). The Supreme Court rejected the private attorney general exception,
because it required the federal courts to determine a number of issues better left to legislative
resolution, such as determining which statutes were of sufficient importance to justify fee shifting.
Id at 269. Although by its long forbearance Congress has impliedly ratified certain judicially
created exceptions to the American rule, it has reserved to itself the vindication of legislative
policies. Id at 259-62.
The private attorney general exception still enjoys viability in California. See Serrano v,
Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 1303 (1977) (rejecting the rationale of A/yeska).
See also CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1980) (codifying the Serrano doctrine).
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tions to increase the admonitory force of the civil law. 13
Although a fundamental rationale for the American rule is that no one
should be punished for merely bringing or defending a lawsuit,14 courts are
faced with the problem of preserving the effectiveness of the judicial system in
an increasingly litigious society. 15 If a court is forced to waste its limited re-
sources on proceedings that should not have been brought, the entire judicial
system and those it should be serving suffer as a result. Raising the risks of
litigation by reallocating attorneys' fees is one way to discourage the wasting
of judicial resources.
Although the shifting of attorneys' fees for abuses of the judicial system
holds out the promise of alleviating the congestion that cripples courts, 16 it
also holds out the threat of intimidating litigants with potentially meritorious
claims' 7 and inhibiting the growth and refinement of the substantive law. 18
Any exception to the no-fee rule must strike a delicate balance between deter-
ring the abuse of judicial resources and maintaining free access to the courts.
I. THE AMERICAN RULE
It is curious that the principle of nonreimbursement of attorneys' fees
should be so firmly rooted in American practice. In England, courts have had
the power to award counsel fees to prevailing parties since the thirteenth cen-
tury, 19 and they continue to do so today.20
There is some evidence that the English practice was retained for a short
while in early America.2' Some early statutes provided for the award of attor-
neys' fees according to fee schedules. 22 Because these statutory fee schedules
were not updated to reflect the changing value of money, however, they be-
came defunct in practice.23 The precise reasons for the abandonment of fee
shifting remain mysterious, although critics of the American rule have attrib-
uted it to "historical accident" 24 and "judicial preoccupation with stare
decisis." 2
5
Explanations for the abandonment of the English practice generally focus
13. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1174 (1931).
14. See, e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1966).
15. See generally J. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOus SOCIETY (1981).
16. See id, at 176-78; Comment, supra note 2, at 651.
17. See Comment, supra note 2, at 651; Note, supra note 2, at 593-94.
18. See Comment, supra note 2, at 652; Note, Attorneys' Liability to Clients'.Adversariesfor
Instituting Frivolous Lawsuits: AReassertion of Old Values, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 775, 796 (1979).
19. For a discussion of the evolution of fee shifting in England, see McCormick, supra note 9,
at 618-19; Stoebuck, CounselFees Includedin Costs: 4 LogicalDevelopment, 38 U. COLO. L. REV.
202, 204-07 (1966).
20. See Comment, supra note 2, at 638 n.7 (discussing current English practice).
21. See McCormick, supra note 9, at 620-21; Comment, supra note 2, at 640-42.
22. McCormick, supra note 9, at 620; see also Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 873-74
(1929).
23. See McCormick, supra note 9, at 620-21.
24. Ehrenzweig, supra note 4, at 798.
25. Comment, supra note 2, at 642.
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on public perceptions of law and lawyers in early America. Lawyers were
viewed as characters of disrepute, whose power and prosperity were to be jeal-
ously restrained.26 The law was not perceived as a complex or scientific body
of knowledge, but rather as a matter of common sense and equitable princi-
ples, so that acting as an attorney was not thought to entitle one to compensa-
tion.27 Because frontier trials were scarce and were occasions for huge public
enjoyment,28 one writer has theorized that Americans did not wish to erect
any penalty that might have the effect of discouraging the trial of cases.29
For whatever reasons, the rule of nonreimbursement was apparently so
well-engrained by 1796, that the Supreme Court, when it first addressed the
issue, that the Court. remarked that although the practice might not be strictly
correct, it was the general practice of the United States and one that was "enti-
tled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified, by statute." 30
Although the no-fee rule has been subject to some legislative and judicial
modification since 1796, it is still well-entrenched, but not without serious
flaws. The obvious effect of the American rule is that the party who prevails in
a lawsuit is, in at least one respect, a loser. The net recovery received by a
successful plaintiff will have been reduced by his counsel fees and other
nonrecoverable expenses of litigation. The victory of a prevailing defendant is
tainted by the fact that he will still be responsible for the attorney's fees in-
curred in the defense of the action. This state of affairs has been the basis of
the most compelling criticism of the American rule: that a wronged party can-
not be made completely whole.3l One early advocate of reform asked: "On
what principle ofjustice can a plaintiff wrongfully run down on a public high-
way recover his doctor's bill but not his lawyer's bill?"'32
The failure of our legal system to award a full measure of recovery has
given rise to the criticism that the American rule discourages the initiation or
defense of lawsuits involving small amounts of money.33 A potential plaintiff
who has a meritorious but small claim will often suffer the injustice done to
him rather than bring an action, because any judgment he might recover
would be equalled or exceeded by the cost of bringing the action.34 A contin-
gent fee arrangement is not an antidote to this problem because the contingent
fee is not appropriate in every case and might not be acceptable to an attorney
in a close case or in one involving a small amount of money. A system of fee
shifting could be an incentive for indigents to vindicate clear rights in court
26. Id at 640-41. See generally Grant, Observations on the Pernicious Practice of Law, 68
A.B.A. J. 580 (1982).
27. R. POUND, THE SPxRrr oF THE COMMON LAW 112-38 (1921); Goodhart, supra note 22, at873.
28. R. POUND, supra note 27, at 124-27.
29. McCormick, supra note 9, at 641-42.
30. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 306, - (1796).
31. F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 128 n.15 (1974); Kuenzel, supra
note 4, at 84; Comment, supra note 2, at 649.
32. Judicial Counsel of Mass., First Report, 11 MAss. L.Q. 1, 64 (1925).
33. Ehrenzweig, supra note 4, at 792; Comment, supra note 2, at 650-51.
34. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 4, at 792-94.
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and would make legal "aid" a matter of right.35
Conversely, a defendant might choose not to challenge a disputed claim,
or even a groundless claim, if the costs of defending the claim would exceed
the plaintiff's demands. 36 To this extent, the American rule may function as a
"legalized form of blackmail" 37 that encourages frivolous claims and adds to
the congestion of courts.
3 8
Proponents of the American rule, while recognizing that it fails to provide
full compensation to a prevailing party,39 maintain that this flaw is out-
weighed by important countervailing interests. One commentator has argued
that total redress is in itself an impracticable ideal:
The web of events connects every wrongful act with too many varied
losses and injuries for the law to protect against them all. The law
selects certain risks of loss and injury and requires the wrongdoers to
bear these; others . the law finds it more expedient to pass over.
The essential question here, as always in such problems of delimita-
tion of interests to be protected, is one of expediency or public
good.40
A variety of objections to fee shifting have been raised to justify the con-
clusion that the no-fee rule is in the public good. One objection is that attor-
ney's fees are too remote from the original injury to be included in the
measure of damages.41 This objection is not compelling, however, because it
is foreseeable and often necessary that the injured person will obtain the serv-
ices of an attorney in order to gain redress for those injuries.4 2 A lawyer's fee
for obtaining financial redress of an injury is only slightly more removed from
the original wrong than is a physician's fee for physical redress of an injury,
yet physicians' fees are routinely included in the measure of damages.
The fear that lawyers' fees might become exorbitant if they could be
shifted to an opponent43 is similarly unfounded, given the discretion of the
court to determine and award an amount that constitutes a reasonable fee in
the case.44 Moreover, there is no indication that the cost of lawyers' services
have increased in the numerous situations in which courts now award attor-
35. See id at 796. Cf. Comment, supra note 2, at 651-52 (noting that fee shifting would deter
poor litigants from bringing novel claims). See generally McLaughlin, The Reco 'ery oAttorney's
Fees: A New Method o/Financing Legal Services, 40 FORDHAm L. REV. 761 (1972).
36. See Kuenzel, supra note 4, at 78.
37. Id
38. Id See also J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 15, at 176-78; Ehrenzweig, supra note 4, at 797.
39. See, e.g., F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 128 n.15 (1974).
40. McCormick, supra note 9, at 641.
41. Id at 639 n.99.
42. See Comment, supra note 2, at 648-49.
43. See McCormick, supra note 9, at 639.
44. See Lystarczyk v. Smits, 435 N.E.2d 1011, 1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). For discussion of
the standards used in determining the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded, see Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-720 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Comment, supra
note 2, at 701-12; Note, supra note 7, at 335-48. See generally Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys
Fees: What is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 281 (1977).
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neys' fees pursuant to various statutes.45
A more serious argument for the maintenance of the American rule is that
the extra time and attention necessary to hear motions, evidence, and argu-
ments on the amount of attorneys' fees would constitute a serious burden on
already-congested courts.46 This extra burden cannot be denied, although
courts would probably become efficient in awarding attorneys' fees if it be-
came a routine matter. When public policy has favored fee shifting,47 courts
have undertaken the added time and cost in levying attorneys' fees.
A number of additional concerns militate against discarding the Ameri-
can rule as a universal practice. One concern expressed by the Supreme Court
is that "having the earnings of the attorney flow from the pen of the judge
before whom he argues" poses a threat to the principle of independent advo-
cacy.48 Presumably, this means that a system of fee shifting would place a
lawyer in position in which he would be tempted to curry favor with the judge
at the expense of his client's interests. The validity of this concern is difficult
to evaluate, although it would be enlightening to study current practices in fee
shifting cases in federal courts. It would appear, however, that if a lawyer
earns court-awarded fees only if he or she prevails, there would not be a con-
flict between the lawyer's interests and the client's interests.
The most compelling argument in favor of maintaining the current prac-
tice of nonreimbursement of attorneys' fees is that universal fee shifting would
discourage free access to the courts in the very type of case that the legal sys-
tem is designed to resolve.49 If a universal system of fee shifting were adopted,
anyone who had a novel, disputed, or uncertain claim involving a substantial
possibility of adverse judgment would be deterred from filing suit by the fear
that he would be responsible for his opponent's attorney's fees as well as his
own.50 Even a litigant who had a contingent fee arrangement with his own
attorney would be deterred from filing suit; this would cancel the benefit of the
contingency fee as a means of financing litigation for litigants of modest
means.
The free access issue is a doubled-edged sword. Some class of persons
will be discouraged from using the courts whether a system of universal fee
shifting is adopted or whether the current system of nonreimbursement is
maintained. Under the current system, small claimants and poor litigants are
deterred from using the courts; the small claimant because the potential recov-
ery may not cover the cost of litigation, and the poor litigant because he can-
45. See McLaughlin, supra note 35, at 781.
46. See F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974); Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); Oelichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. 211,
231 (1872); Trails Trucking, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co., 32 Cal. App.
3d 519, 525, 108 Cal. Rptr. 30, 34 (1973).
47. See supra note 8.
48. F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974).
49. See id; Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967);
Cordeco Dev. Corp. v. Santiago Vasquez, 539 F.2d 256, 263 (1976). See also McCormick, supra
note 9, at 639-40.
50. See Comment, supra note 2, at 651-52.
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not afford the cost of bringing the litigation. Because court congestion is one
of the greatest problems facing modem courts, public policy favors the out-of-
court settlement of small claims and the expansion and use of small claims
courts.51 The use of the contingency fee in appropriate cases and the availa-
bility of legal aid organizations help to improve access to the courts for poor
litigants.52 In any case, a poor litigant who has a novel or disputed claim
would be doubly deterred under a fee shifting system, because he would run
the risk of responsibility for two attorneys' fees if he lost the suit.
5 3
The deterrence of disputed claims under a broad fee-shifting rule is
troubling for several reasons. First, it is the disputed claim that should be
brought to the judicial system for resolution, because no other social system
provides an adequate process for resolving disputes of fact and law or provid-
ing the finality and enforceability of courts' judgments. Second, disputed and
uncertain claims are instruments for the development and refinement of the
substantive law. In a society in which flexibility and growth in the law are
prized, it does not make sense to erect obstacles to the institution of such
suits.5 4 This is particularly true in areas of law, such as tort law, that are
growing rapidly.
Given the magnitude of the social and political consequences that would
be caused by complete abrogation of the American rule, it is no wonder that
courts have repeatedly stated that such a change should be made by the legis-
lature.55 Even if the maintenance of the American rule is justified in most
cases, however, it does not follow that it is appropriate in all cases. Fact-
specific exceptions to the American rule can be used to remedy some of the
flaws in the rule enumerated by its critics. Deterrence of frivolous litigation,
compensation of litigants who have been wrongfully subjected to litigation,
and punishment of abusive litigation practices can be accomplished through
the principled use of the punitive exceptions to the American rule.
II. PUNITIVE EXCEPTIONS TO THE AMERICAN RULE
All of the exceptions to the American rule serve a compensatory function,
since they all permit reimbursement of the benefited party for actual, out-of-
pocket expenses. If compensation were the only rationale, however, there
51. Comment, supra note 2, at 651. But see Ehrenzweig, supra note 4, at 795-96 (arguing that
small claims courts are an inadequate solution because not available in every community or fre-
quently function as mere collection agencies).
Statutory authorization for fee shifting in small claims cases would permit full compensation
for small claimants. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 20.080 (1981). Such a statute, however, should
allow fees awards to a prevailing defendant only if the suit had been groundless. Otherwise, small
claimants with disputed or close claims would be deterred by the fear of being responsible for two
fees.
52. Comment, supra note 2, at 651-52.
53. See McLaughlin, supra note 35, at 784-88; Comment, supra note 2, at 651.
54. See Comment, supra note 2, at 652. See also Note, supra note 18, at 796.
55. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 250, 262
(1975); F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 131 (1974); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796); Young v. Redman, 55 Cal. App. 3d 827, 840, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86, 93-94
(1976); Sorin v. Board of Educ., - Ohio St.2d - , 347 N.E.2d 527, 529 (1976).
1983]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
would be no American rule. The compensation rationale must, therefore, be
ancillary to other policies that compel compensating some, but not all, litigants
for their transactional expenses in bringing or defending lawsuits.
Therefore, when an exception to the American rule is made there must
have been something about the case that justifies taxing the amount of money
necessary to pay attorneys' fees to one of the litigants and awarding it to the
other. That "something" is usually found in some blameworthy conduct ex-
hibited by the party against whom the fees are assessed. When the blamewor-
thy conduct consists of some abuse of the judicial system, the exceptions may
compensate the individual injured by the abuse, but the interest vindicated is
the preservation of judicial authority and resources.
A. Awards of Attorneys' Fees in Civil Contempt Proceedings
Contempt of court is an act of disobedience or disrespect toward a judi-
cial body, or obstruction of a court's orderly process.56 The power to punish
contempt through summary civil or criminal procedures is an inherent judicial
power.57 In the United States, contempt of court is considered to be an insult
"offered to the authority of the people themselves, and not to the humble
agents of the law, whom they employ in the conduct of their government."58
The violation of a court order also has the potential of causing injury to a
litigant's opponent. In recognition of this possibility, an individual who is
harmed by his opponent's violation of a court order may institute a private
action for civil contempt.59 In such actions, most frequently initiated by a
postjudgment motion,60 the plaintiff may be compensated for actual losses re-
sulting from the contemnor's defiance.
61
An overwhelming majority of courts have held that the actual damages
recoverable in a civil contempt proceeding are not limited to the ordinary
losses directly traceable to the contemnor's noncompliance, but also include
transactional costs, such as attorneys' fees.62 The Supreme Court has stated
56. R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 1 (1963).
57. Id at 2. See also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-66 (1980); Cooke v.
United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925).
58. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 56, at 4 (quoting Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 331, 341 (1858)).
59. See generally Rendleman, Compensatory Contempt: Plaintif's Remedy When Defendant
Violates an Injunction, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 971.
60. Id at 974.
61. Id at 971-72, 986.
62. E.g., Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399,428 (1923); Allied Materials
Corp. v. Superior Prods. Co., 620 F.2d 224, 227 (10th Cir. 1980); Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp.,
559 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1977); Sheila's Shine Prods., Inc. v. Sheila Shine, Inc., 486 F.2d 114 (5th
Cir. 1973); Moody v. State ex re. Payne, 355 So. 2d 1116 (Ala. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910
(1978); Lewis v. Lorenz, 144 Colo. 23, 27, 354 P.2d 1008, 1011 (1960); Thomas v. Woollen, 255
Ind. 612, 615, 266 N.E.2d 20, 22 (1971); In re Marriage of Morriss, 573 S.W.2d 101 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978); Frankel v. Moskovitz, 503 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); State ex rel Fraternal Order of
Police v. City of Dayton, 49 Ohio St. 2d 219, 361 N.E.2d 428 (1977); Arvin, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of
Am., 215 Va. 704, 213 S.E.2d 753 (1975); Ramstead v. Hauge, 73 Wash. 2d 162, 437 P.2d 402
(1968). Attorneys' fees are not recoverable in criminal contempt proceedings, however. See
Moody, 355 So. 2d at 1119.
A few courts have implied that attorneys' fees cannot be awarded in civil contempt proceed-
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that the power to award fees in such cases is one of the inherent powers of
courts. 63 Under this exception to the American rule, however, recoverable fees
are limited to those incurred in bringing the contempt action, and do not in-
clude those incurred in bringing the original suit 64 or in defending an appeal
of the contempt judgment.65 There is some authority holding that a defendant
who is successful in exonerating himself from a contempt charge may not re-
cover his attorney's fees.66 Ordinarily, fees will not be awarded to a plaintiff
who claims injury from wrongful conduct, but is unsuccessful in establishing
contempt.67
The creation of this exception is justified by the broad discretion needed
to enforce compliance with court orders. As one court explained:
Courts have, and must have, the inherent authority to enforce their
judicial orders and decrees in cases of civil contempt. Discretion,
including the discretion to award attorneys' fees, must be left to a
court in the enforcement of its decrees. The theory for allowing at-
torneys' fees for civil contempt is that civil contempt is a sanction to
enforce compliance with an order or to compensate for losses or
damages sustained by reason of non-compliance. 68
The overriding goal of preserving court authority is furthered by the extraction
of a financial penalty in the form of otherwise nonrecoverable damages from
the contemnor.69 This penalty is designed to coerce the contemnor's compli-
ance, 70 and to discourage others from flouting court authority.
71
The need to make full compensation to the injured is compelling in con-
tempt cases. The person who institutes the contempt proceeding is the instru-
ment for the enforcement of the law and the vindication of the court's
authority. It would be undesirable for this person to be required to bear the
ings absent statutory or other authorization. See In re Marriage of Neidert, 583 S.W.2d 461, 463
(rex. Civ. App. 1979) (dictum). Cf. Bauguess v. Paine, 22 Cal. 3d 626, 586 P.2d 942, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 461 (1978) (not within inherent power of trial court to require attorney whose alleged mis-
conduct caused mistrial to pay opponent's fees); Wisniewski v. Clary, 46 Cal. App. 3d 499, 120
Cal. Rptr. 176 (1975) (trial court had no rule authorizing imposition of fees for failure to appear;,
fees could not be imposed as a condition of dismissal).
63. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-66 (1980); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.
v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240, 275 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. E.., Thompson v. Johnson, 410 F. Supp. 633, 643 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aft'd, 556 F.2d 568 (3d
Cir. 1977); Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 376 F. Supp. 514,519 (W.D. Pa. 1974), vacated,
511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975).
65. McFerran v. McFerran, 55 Wash. 2d 471, 476, 348 P.2d 222, 225 (1960).
66. See Glo-Klen Co. v. Far W. Chem. Prods., Inc., 53 Wash. 2d 9, 12, 330 P.2d 180, 182
(1958).
67. Hensley v. Board of Unified School Dist. No. 443, 210 Kan. 858, 864, 504 P.2d 184, 189-
90 (1972). See also Rendleman, supra note 59, at 1001 n.144. But cf. Thompson v. Johnson, 410
F. Supp. 633, 644 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (suggesting in dicta that fees might be recoverable even when
the court, in its discretion, does not issue a citation of contempt).
68. Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 559 F.2d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 1977).
69. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691 (1978) (award of fees against obdurate litigant
similar to contempt sanction, vindicating court's authority over recalcitrant litigant and discourag-
ing protracted litigation).
70. Thomas v. Woollen, 255 Ind. 612, 615, 266 N.E.2d 20, 22 (1971); Frankel v. Moskovitz,
503 S.W.2d 428, 432 (Mo. CL App. 1973).
71. Rendleman, supra note 59, at 999.
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costs of enforcing the court's order, for this would further reduce the benefits
that he would have enjoyed but for the contemnor's noncompliance. 72 Fur-
thermore, in many cases the only cognizable loss caused by contempt will be
the attorneys' fees incurred in enforcing the court's order.
73
In view of the plaintiff's position as a facilitator of desirable social policy,
it is important that there be no disincentive to his instituting contempt pro-
ceedings. The availability of full compensation encourages plaintiffs to act as
"private attorneys general" in instituting actions that vindicate court
authority.
74
The desire to maintain the incentive for individuals to bring socially de-
sirable private actions is so important that courts have held it proper to award
attorneys' fees against a contemnor even when there is no proof of willfulness
in the violation of a court order.75 In Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hospital,
76
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the propriety of plaintiffs' recovery
of damages and attorneys' fees compensating them for "bringing appellants'
contempt to the court's attention," 77 despite the absence of proof that the con-
temnor's noncompliance had been deliberate. The court rejected the contem-
nor's argument that the Supreme Court in Alyeska had limited the award of
attorneys' fees to instances of "willful" disobedience of a court's order,78 stat-
ing that.Aiyeska had not abrogated the inherent authority of a court to enforce
its orders by any means necessary.
79
In awarding attorneys' fees for compensatory purposes, the court stated
that it was merely seeking to ensure that its original order was followed.80
Regardless of whether the disobedience was willful, the plaintiffs' costs in
72. See Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 559 F.2d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 1977).
73. See, e.g., Thompson v. Johnson, 410 F. Supp. 633, 643 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (mental anguish
not proper element of compensatory damages). See also Rendleman, supra note 59, at 1001-02.
74. See Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 559 F.2d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 1977); Rendleman, supra
note 59, at 998.
"Private attorney general" here refers to the idea that a private individual is encouraged to
institute a legal proceeding that furthers a social interest as well as his own self-interest. One of
the justifications for the imposition of punitive damages is that it provides an incentive for individ-
uals to bring wrongdoers to justice. See D. DoBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9,
at 205 (1973); Morris, supra note 13, at 1183-88. Presumably, the same rationale is true of any
other extraordinary bounty offered to a claimant, including devices such as treble damages and
the award of attorneys' fees.
75. Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 559 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1977); Ramstead v. Hauge, 73
Wash. 2d 162, 166,437 P.2d 402,405 (1960) (acting on advice of counsel no excuse). Cf. Gaddis v.
Wyman, 336 F. Supp. 1225, 1227 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (mem.) (no willful violation, but no fees
awarded because lawyers of publicly funded legal aid association expended no personal funds).
See also Rendleman, supra note 59, at 1000-01.
76. 559 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1977).
77. Id. at 271.
78. Id at 271-73. The argument was based on language in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258 (1975) (quoting Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing
Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967)), in which the Court stated that "a court may assess attorney's fees
for the 'willful disobedience of a court order ... as part of the fine to be levied on the
defendant."'
79. 559 F.2d at 272. The court remanded the case to the trial court for hearing on and deter-
mination of the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees. Id at 273.
80. Id at 272.
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bringing the matter to the attention of the court would be the same, and those
costs would otherwise reduce the benefit gained by the prevailing party.8' The
decision in Cook is well-founded for several other reasons relating to judicial
authority and economy. If a scienter element were required for awarding at-
torneys' fees in civil contempt proceedings, some violators might escape sanc-
tion merely because wrongful intent is difficult to prove. Moreover, such an
element would require additional litigation in an already protracted
proceeding.
Thus, awarding attorneys' fees to a prevailing plaintiff in a contempt pro-
ceeding serves a variety of desirable functions. The award provides an addi-
tional sanction designed to enforce a court's orders, fully compensates the
party injured by the violation of those orders, and supports the underlying
substantive law that originally gave rise to the order.
This exception to the American rule is particularly appropriate because
the normal objections to fee shifting do not apply when one of the parties has
violated a court order. The necessity of hiring an attorney to enforce a clear
right pursuant to a court decree is a foreseeable consequence of the contem-
nor's noncompliance. There simply is no course of action open to the person
injured by his opponent's disregard of a court order other than to return to the
court for its assistance in enforcing the order.
Furthermore, the levying of attorneys' fees in such cases does not involve
a great additional burden on the court. Because of the contemnor's obstinacy,
the court will have already been forced to hold an expensive and protracted
proceeding. The only additional work will be to determine the amount of a
reasonable attorney's fee for the preparation of the contempt proceeding. In
addition, any threat to the independence of attorneys that might exist in a
universal system of fee shifting is not present in contempt cases. The plain-
tiff's attorney will not be placed in an inherent conflict of interest situation,
since his client's interest and the judge's interest are one: to insure compliance
with the court's prior ruling.
Finally, shifting attorneys' fees to a contemnor does not pose any threat to
free access to the courts. The parties involved in a contempt proceeding will
have already appeared before the court in which the decree question was ren-
dered. Fee shifting in this limited situation poses no threat to other persons
who contemplate filing or defending a lawsuit. Rather, it facilitates access to
the courts by those injured by their opponents' noncompliance with court or-
ders. In addition, fee shifting in this instance cannot chill the further develop-
ment of the substantive law in evolving areas of jurisprudence because the
substantive issue at hand will have already been decided.
The only person whose access to the court might be deterred is the de-
fendant contemnor, since he cannot recover his attorney's fees if he is success-
ful in defending the action. Fearing liability for two attorneys' fees, he might
choose not to defend the contempt proceeding. On the other hand, the threat
81. Id
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could encourage the desired voluntary compliance with the court's order. Pre-
sumably, the exonerated contemnor might have the option of seeking his fees
under the bad faith exception if the contempt proceeding had been instituted
in bad faith.8
2
In sum, the award of attorneys' fees in contempt proceedings promotes
the authority of the courts, the enforcement of the substantive law, and the
compensation of the injured without posing a threat to the interests that un-
derlie the American rule.
B. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees Incurred in Prior Litigation with a Third
Party
Another exception to the general rule of nonreimbursement of attorneys'
fees has been recognized in situations in which a defendant has, through some
wrongful or tortious action, subjected the plaintiff to previous litigation with a
third party.83 This exception, often referred to as the "prior litigation" or
"third party" exception, allows attorneys' fees incurred in the bringing or de-
fense of previous litigation to be included as an item of damages in a suit
against the party whose wrongful act caused that litigation.84 The attorneys'
fees so incurred are considered the natural and proximate consequences of the
defendant's tort.85 The elements of the prior litigation exception have been
succinctly set out by a District of Columbia appellate court:
(1) The plaintiff must have incurred attorneys' fees in the prosecu-
tion or defense of a prior action;
(2) the litigation ordinarily must have been with a third party and
not with the defendant in the present action; and
(3) the plaintiff must have become involved in such litigation be-
cause of some tortious act of the defendant.8
6
Unlike the contempt exception, in which attorneys' fees are imposed for
conduct that threatens judicial authority, the prior litigation exception imposes
attorneys' fees for conduct that threatens judicial resources. In contrast to the
contempt plaintiff who recovers attorneys' fees incurred in the preparation of
the contempt proceeding but not those incurred in presenting the main action,
the prior litigation plaintiff recovers fees incurred in the presentation of the
prior action against a third party, but not those incurred in prosecution of the
action against the tortfeasor whose wrongful conduct instigated the prior ac-
tion.87 Attorneys' fees are part of the damages caused by the original wrong
82. See infra notes 171-213 and accompanying text.
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914 (1977); McCormick, supra note 9, at 631;
Comment, Recovery of Attorney Feesfrom Third Party Tortfeasors, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 94 (1978).
84. Eg., Earven v. Smith, 127 Ariz. 354, 621 P.2d 41 (1980); Prentice v. North Am. Title
Guar. Corp., 59 Cal. 2d 618,381 P.2d 645, 30 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1963) (in bank [sic]); Brem v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 206 A.2d 404 (D.C. 1965); Osborne v. Hay, 284 Or. 133, 585 P.2d 674
(1978); Hoage v. Westlund, 43 Or. App. 435, 602 P.2d 1147 (1979).
85. Brem, 206 A.2d at 407.
86. Biddle v.. Chatel, 421 A.2d 3, 7 (D.C. 1980).
87. See Empire Realty Co. v. Fleisher, 269 Md. 278, 286, 305 A.2d 144, 148-49 (1973).
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that led to the prior litigation, and are not part of the cost of recovering for
that wrong. Although the prior litigation exception is undeniably compensa-
tory, it also punishes and deters conduct that involves an unreasonably great
risk of creating additional burdens on the courts by instigating litigation
among other parties. 88
For example, in Osborne v. Hay89 defendant real estate broker misrepre-
sented income figures on the data sheet of a motel that was being offered for
sale. Relying on these figures, plaintiff purchased the motel. Protracted litiga-
tion with the previous owner of the motel ensued when plaintiff stopped mak-
ing payments after learning of the discrepancies in the income figures. When
plaintiff later brought suit against the real estate broker, the Oregon Supreme
Court affirmed the award of expenses of the prior litigation suffered as a result
of defendant's fraud.90
At least one court has evidenced an intent to apply the prior litigation
exception only to circumstances in which the dispute isprimariy with a third
party and occurs prior to litigation with the actual tortfeasor.9 1 Such a rigid
construction of the rule is unjustified. If the purpose of the prior litigation
exception is to punish and deter conduct that exposes an innocent party to
litigation, it should not matter whether the dispute with the tortfeasor who
caused that litigation occurs before, during, or after the dispute with the third
party. The key factor should be whether the defendant was guilty of some
wrongful conduct that caused the plaintiff to be involved in litigation other
88. See Comment,.rupra note 83, at 97. See also Contra Costa County Title Co. v. Wolff, 184
Cal. App. 2d 59, 68, 7 Cal. Rptr. 358, 363 (1960) (recovery of fees based on conduct "calculated to
result in litigation").
89. 284 Or. 133, 585 P.2d 674 (1978).
90. Id at 142, 585 P.2d at 679.
91. Biddle v. Chatel, 421 A.2d 3 (D.C. 1980). In Biddle plaintiffs had sought the services of
defendant real estate brokerage firm in helping them locate a house with a garage. They eventu-
ally purchased a house based on defendant's assurances that an alley which provided sole access
to the garage was a public alley. After purchasing the house and using the alley, they received
notice from a neighbor, Mrs. Yasuna, that the alley belonged to her. In fact, evidence was admit-
ted at trial which showed that defendant had been involved with Mrs. Yasuna's purchase of her
property some years before. After seeking satisfaction from defendant, the Biddles filed actions
against Mrs. Yasuna to establish a prescriptive easement over the alley and against the brokers for
misrepresentation. The suit with Mrs. Yasuna was eventually settled out of court after defendant
paid Mrs. Yasuna $10,000 for easement rights. The action against the brokerage firm was main-
tamed, and plaintiffs sought to recover the cost of the easement suit against Mrs. Yasuna from
defendant.
Although the case appeared to meet the requirements of the prior litigation exception, the
court held that it failed on all three. First, the court noted that the action against Mrs. Yasuna had
not been a previous action, but rather had been filed concurrently with the misrepresentation
action against defendant. Second, the court found the trial court's statement that fees were being
awarded as a matter of equity to be insufficient, and stated that the court must have explicitly
found the existence of a tort on the part of defendant. Most compelling to the court was its finding
that the initial dispute was primarily between the Biddles and Chatel, rather than between the
Biddles and Mrs. Yasuna. It stated that the Biddies had initially sought compensation from de-
fendant, and Mrs. Yasuna had been drawn into the litigation as an afterthought. As such, it
affirmed the denial of fees. The court had noted that it could not ignore the salient fact that
defendant had financed the settlement between the Biddles and Mrs. Yasuna. Thus, the court
may have felt that defendant had discharged its obligation to avert litigation by facilitating the
settlement of the case. Id at 8-9.
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than a mere suit by the plaintiff to gain redress for that conduct.92
A party could escape the operation of the American rule by gratuitously
naming a third party as a "front" for his dispute with the primary tortfeasor.
Thus, the plaintiff should be required to prove that the action against the third
party was reasonably necessary. When a reasonably necessary and good faith
dispute with a third party is found to have resulted from the defendant's
wrongful conduct, courts should not insist that a separate action be filed
against the tortfeasor who caused the litigation. 93 Construing literally the
"prior" in "prior litigation" runs counter to considerations of judicial econ-
omy, which militate in favor of settling all related issues in the same proceed-
ing by a judge who is knowledgeable of the facts of the dispute.
94
The degree of misconduct justifying application of the prior litigation ex-
ception has expanded with the development of the doctrine. Originally, the
prior litigation exception applied only to palpable and intentional misconduct
on the part of the defendant, such as fraud, malicious prosecution, slander of
title, false imprisonment, tortious removal from office, or conversion. 95 More
recently, however, the application of the prior litigation exception has been
expanded to embrace cases in which the tortfeasor's conduct was merely negli-
gent.96 Thus, real estate brokers, insurance agents, escrow holders, and others
whose ordinary negligence is likely to cause litigation for third parties are
common targets for this exception.
In a seminal California case, Prentice v. North American Title Guaranty
Corporation ,97 an escrow holder erred in the closing of the sale of a parcel of
real estate, necessitating a quiet title action by plaintiffs against the buyers and
first mortgagee of the property. In the same action, plaintiffs sought to recover
the expenses of the action from the negligent escrow holder. The California
Supreme Court stated that if the tort of another requires a person to act in
protection of his interests by bringing or defending a lawsuit against a third
person, he is entitled to recover the reasonably necessary expenditures thereby
caused.98 It commented that the American rule, codified in California,99 pro-
92. McCormick, supra note 9, at 632.
93. Conversely, a party cannot escape the American rule by the mere institution of a second
suit against an opponent for the expenses of the first. Id at 633.
94. Several courts have dispensed with the requirement of a separate litigation. See, e.g.,
Prentice v. North Amer. Title Guar. Corp., 59 Cal. 2d 618, 621, 381 P.2d 645, 647, 30 Cal. Rptr.
821, 823 (1963) (en banc): "there is no reason why recovery of such fees should be denied simply
because the two causes ... are tried in the same court at the same time." See also Ruth v. Lytton
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 266 Cal. App. 2d 831, 845, 72 Cal. Rptr. 521, 530 (1968); Hoage v. Westlund,
43 Or. App. 435, 602 P.2d 1147 (1979).
95. See McCormick, supra note 9, at 631-35; Comment, supra note 83, at 97; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 671(b) (1977) (reasonable expense of defense included as an item of special
damages in a malicious prosecution case).
96. See, e.g., Highlands Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Elegant6 Inns, Inc., 361 So. 2d 1060, 1066
(Ala. 1978) (per curiam); Earp v. Nobmann, 122 Cal. App. 3d 270, 175 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1981);
Manning v. Sifford, 111 Cal. App. 3d 7, 168 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1980); Hoage v. Westlund, 43 Or. App.
35, 602 P.2d 1147 (1979).
97. 59 Cal. 2d 618, 381 P.2d 645, 30 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1963) (in bank [sic]).
98. Id at 620, 381 P.2d at 647, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
99. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021 (West 1954).
[Vol. 61
PUNITIVE A TORNVEYS' FEES
hibits fee shifting only in ordinary two-party cases, and is not applicable when
the defendant has made it necessary to sue third persons.100 The award of fees
against the escrow holder was distinguishable because it was an award of dam-
ages and not an award of costs. 01 In addition, the court held that there was no
reason to limit the operation of the exception to prior actions, since the de-
fendant was not prejudiced by the resolution of the two issues in the same
action. 102
The broad language of Prentice expanded the potential application of the
prior litigation exception on two fronts. First, it permitted the recovery of fees
without the necessity of instituting a later, separate action against the
tortfeasor. Second, it imposed attorneys' fees when the defendant's conduct
had been less culpable than intentionally wrongful conduct. If the commis-
sion of any tort that leads to litigation with third parties can be the basis for
shifting fees, it would stand to reason that the exception could be widely used
in product liability and medical malpractice litigation. A supplier named as a
defendant in a product liability suit along with the manufacturer of the prod-
uct could argue that the manufacturer should be required to indemnify him
for the expenses of defending the suit.'0 3 A physician named as a defendant
in a malpractice suit based on the supply of a defective medical product could
argue that the manufacturer of the defective product should indemnify him for
the cost of his defense. 104 Although these arguments seem convincing under
the language of Prentice, courts have not accepted them under the prior litiga-
tion exception.
For example, in Trails Trucking, Inc. v. Bendix- Westinghouse Automotive
Air Brake Co. ,05 plaintiff's truck was involved in a collision with a third
party, Crews. Crews sued Trails, and Trails cross-complained against the
manufacturer of the truck's brakes, Bendix. When Bendix was found to have
been at fault in the manufacture of the brakes, Trails brought a separate action
over against Bendix for reimbursement of the expenses of its litigation with
Crews. The California Court of Appeals refused to award attorneys' fees to
Trails, stating that the third party exception was only to be used in extraordi-
100. Prentice v. North Amer. Title Guar. Corp., 59 Cal. 2d 618, 620, 381 P.2d 645, 647, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 821, 823 (1963) (in bank [sic]).
101. Id But see Comment, supra note 83, at 99 (questioning the logic of distinguishing costs
from damages in this situation).
102. Prentice, 59 Cal. 2d at 620, 381 P.2d at 647, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
103. See, eg., Davis v. Air Technical Indus., Inc., 22 Cal. 3d 1, 582 P.2d 1010, 148 Cal. Rptr.
419 (1978) (in bank [sic]); Trails Trucking, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake
Co., 32 Cal. App. 3d 519, 108 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1973); Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 306 Minn. 300,
235 N.W.2d 848 (1975).
104. See Oskenholt v. Lederle Laboratories, 51 Or. App. 419, 625 P.2d 1357 (1981). In Os-
kenholt, a physician was sued by a patient when a drug he had prescribed caused blindness. The
physician settled the malpractice suit for $100,000. He then sued the manufacturer of the drug,
seeking to recover the cost of the settlement. The Oregon Court of Appeals analyzed the case
under the prior litigation exception and remanded the case for further consideration of factual
issues. Although the physician had not asked to recover his attorney's fees, the court stated that he
would be able to recover expenses if he could prove their reasonableness.
105. 32 Cal. App. 3d 519, 108 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1973).
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nary cases. 106 Although no language in Prentice required it,'0 7 the court
stated that since there was no fraud, separate litigation brought by Bendix, or
chain of vexatious litigation, there was nothing to justify the court in opening
up a "Pandora's Box" of prolonged litigation.'08 Although Bendix owed
Trails the duty to manufacture its brakes carefully so as not to harm Trails'
truck, it had not undertaken any duty to pay Trails' attorneys' fees. 109 To
impose such a duty, stated the court, might deter and defeat settlement, caus-
ing a multiplicity of litigation by successful defendants. "0
In a similar case, Davis v. Air Technical Industries, Inc.,"' the California
Supreme Court reached the same result, but used a different analysis. In Da-
vis, the manufacturer and the retailer of a defective elevator were named as
defendants in a product liability suit. The retailer cross-complained against
the manufacturer, seeking indemnification for the judgment as well as the at-
torneys' fees for defense of the action. The court stated that an exceptional
case must be presented to justify the shifting of fees, and that fees would not
be shifted in the ordinary product liability case. 1 2 The court distinguished
Prentice by stating that the Prentice rule would not be applicable when a party
had defended for his own benefit rather than for the benefit of another whose
actual default had caused the litigation.' ' 3 Over a vigorous dissent by Justice
Mosk, who argued that this was a paradigm situation for full indemnification
because the seller was innocent of any wrongdoing," t4 the court refused to
indemnify the seller for the cost of defense of the action.115 The majority's
underlying reasoning was that "the judicial exception would swallow the
rule." 116
Obviously, the courts in Trails and Davis were pursuing a policy of con-
tainment, but their reasoning requires clarification beyond the conclusion that
these cases were not "extraordinary." The language of Prentice can be con-
strued to permit fee changing in almost any multiple party case when one of
the defendants is primarily culpable. Danger exists in the application of a
simple "but for" test which would provide that but for the acts of one of the
defendants, the other would not have been exposed to litigation.
In product liability cases like Trails and Davis, both the distributor and
the manufacturer of the product owe independent duties to the consumer. To
hold a manufacturer of a product responsible for the defense costs of a distrib-
utor based only on a "but for" rationale would impose on the manufacturer a
106. Id at 525, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
107. Comment, supra note 83, at 100 n.33.
108. Trails Trucking, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co., 32 Cal. App.
3d 519, 525, 108 Cal. Rptr. 30, 34 (1973).
109. Id at 525, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 33-34.
110. Id
111. 22 Cal. 3d 1, 582 P.2d 1010, 148 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1978) (in bank[sic]).
112. Id at 5, 7, 582 P.2d at 1012, 1014, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 421, 423.
113. Id at 5, 582 P.2d at 1012, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 421.
114. Id at 8-11, 582 P.2d at 1014-16; 148 Cal. Rptr. at 423-25 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
115. Id at 8, 582 P.2d at 1014, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
116. 1d at 7, 582 P.2d at 1013, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
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duty to pay for the defense of issues not confined to its manufacturing of a
defective product. Total indemnification of the distributor would remove him
from the scheme of risk distribution that the courts and legislatures have seen
fit to impose in their development of product liability law. Distributor indem-
nification would not encourage the manufacturer as the "true" defendant to
come in and defend, since he will have already been named by the plaintiff. If
anything, it might nurture nuisance suits; manufacturers would be encouraged
to make quick settlements of relatively small claims instead of disputing the
claims against them.
In addition, such an application of the prior litigation exception distorts
the purpose of the exception, which is not only to provide compensation to
those who have been wrongfully exposed to litigation, but also to promote
judicial economy by punishing and deterring the avoidable use of the
courts.117 The breach of duty that leads to liability for the marketing of a
defective product is a broad, flexible duty owed primarily to the consumer of
the product; proof of fault on the part of the manufacturer is usually not re-
quired. The marketing of a defective product creates no inherent or foresee-
able abuse of the courts" l8 that would be deterred by application of the
exception. In any case, adequate deterrence to the marketing of defective
products already exists through liberal doctrines providing for compensatory
and punitive damages in product liability actions. The imposition of an addi-
tional sanction in the form of liability for a codefendant's attorney's fees
would prolong litigation for no perceptible gain.
On the other hand, an argument can be made that it is justifiable to im-
pose liability for attorneys' fees on a defendant who has exposed another to
litigation through his negligent miscarriage of a clear contractual obligation.
Examples of such conduct would include an insurance agent's negligent en-
dorsement of a policy to a third person,' 19 a title company's negligent failure
to prorate taxes on a building, 120 or a real estate broker's negligent misrepre-
sentation of the attributes or boundaries of a parcel of real estate.
1 21
These situations do not present the problem of independent breaches of
duty owed to a third party by both the tortfeasor and the person whom he has
exposed to litigation. Rather, they involve the exposure of a trusting innocent
to litigation with some third party. Although the negligent execution of a con-
tractual duty does not constitute morally reprehensible conduct or involve an
inherent abuse of the courts, such conduct has a high probability of causing
litigation. This is especially true when the tortfeasor holds a position of re-
117. Comment, supra note 83, at 96-97.
118. Cf id at 97 (arguing no inherent abuse in quiet title actions).
119. See Highlands Underwriters Ins. co. v. Elegantd Inns, Inc., 361 So. 2d 1060 (Ala. 1978)
(per curiam) (approving the application of the prior litigation exception but remanding for proof
of reasonable attorneys' fees).
120. See Hoage v. Westlund, 43 Or. App. 435, 602 P.2d 1147 (1979).
121. See, e.g., Manning v. Sifford, 11l Cal. App. 3d 7, 168 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1980) (existence of
an easement); Walters v. Marler, 83 Cal. App. 3d 1, 147 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1978) (misdescribed
F roperty). But see Pederson v. Kennedy, 128 Cal. App. 3d 976, 979, 180 Cal. Rptr. 740,742 (1982)
Walters in error because it allows attorneys' fees in ordinary two-party case).
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sponsibility over ownership interests in highly regulated items of property,
such as real estate and insurance funds. The interest in preventing avoidable
litigation militates for the establishment of a high degree of care in such
situations.
When the source of the duty owed is a clear contractual obligation rather
than the more nebulous duties found in personal injury and product liability
law, expectations of a high degree of care are not unreasonable. Indeed, there
may be no other adequate deterrent to negligence of this type, since an injured
person's actual damages may consist of no more than the cost of litigating the
prior claim with the third person.
Consequently, application of the prior litigation exception is only appro-
priate when the resulting litigation was a highly foreseeable result of the de-
fendant's conduct. If the exception is applied in a principled manner, focusing
on the purpose of deterring the unnecessary creation of litigation, attorneys'
fees will not be seen as remote from the original harm. As with the contempt
exception, the prior litigation exception requires little additional use ofjudicial
resources, since the court must convene to settle an already protracted pro-
ceeding. Although a party need not have prevailed in the other action to be
compensated for the costs of that action under the prior litigation exception, it
is unlikely that a threat would be posed to independent advocacy by this fee
shifting because the attorney who seeks to apply the exception to a tortfeasor
might not be the same attorney who defended or prosecuted the main action.
When the same attorney tries both actions before the same judge, however, the
attorney might be susceptible to judicial encouragement to settle the main ac-
tion or to other possible divisions of loyalty. That negligible possibility, how-
ever, is not sufficient to override the benefits of the prior litigation exception.
The prior litigation exception deters wrongful conduct giving rise to liti-
gation without affecting the interest in free access to the courts. The exception
does not penalize the injured person's resort to the courts; rather, it compen-
sates him for having been exposed to litigation. Furthermore, since this excep-
tion permits fee awards only for the prosecution or defense of the primary
action, it does not deter the tortfeasor from defending the secondary action in
which the prior litigation exception is raised. Although the normal American
rule applies to the plaintiff's expenses of litigating against the tortfeasor, the
prior litigation exception encourages him to try to obtain compensation for his
expenses incurred in the primary action.
C Awards ofAttorneys' Fees Under the Bad Faith Exception
The most versatile exception to the American rule is avowedly punitive
and is based on the existence of bad faith on the part of one of the litigants. 1
22
The power to levy fees against a party who has litigated in bad faith arises
from the courts' traditional equitable powers 12 3 and has been recognized as an
122. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). See also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691 (1978).
123. Courts of equity in the United States were endowed with the judicial powers possessed by
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inherent, presumably supervisory, power of the federal courts. 124 Although a
few state courts have indicated in dicta the existence of a nonstatutory power
to levy attorneys' fees for bad faith, 25 and at least one state court has used this
power to award fees, 126 the nonstatutory bad faith exception is primarily a
creature of the federal courts.127 Although language in some cases suggests
that the bad faith exception authorizes the award of fees to prevailing parties
only, t28 there are cases in which fees were awarded to nonprevailing parties
the High Court of Chancery of England at the time of adoption of the Constitution. Fontain v.
Ravenel, 58 U.S. 369, 384 (1854); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1845). Included among
these powers was the power to levy attorneys' fees for bad faith litigation. For an extensive treat-
ment of the historical development of this power, see Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City So. Ry.,
28 F.2d 233, 241-46 (8th Cir. 1928), rev'don other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1930); Note,Attorney's Fees
and the Federal Bad Faith Exception, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 319, 323-24 (1977). See also Vaughan v.
Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530 (1962) (power to award fees part of equitable powers of court).
Although the bad faith exception may have arisen in equity cases, application of the excep-
tion has not been limited to suits in equity. Note, supra, at 324.
124. See, eg., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980); Alyeska Pipeline Co.
v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 (1975). See also Note, supra note 123, at 323.
125. See Fownes v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 310 Minn. 540, 542, 246 N.W.2d 700, 702
(1976); Barela v. Barela, 95 N.M. 207, 211,619 P.2d 1251, 1255 (1980), Sorin v. Board of Educ. -
- Ohio St. 2d - , 347 N.E.2d 527, 531 (1976); 1901 Wyoming Ave. Coop. Ass'n v. Lee, 345
A.2d 456,464-65 (D.C. 1975); Lystarczyk v. Smits, - Ind. App. - , 435 N.E.2d 1011, 1016-17
(1982); Umbreit v. Chester B. Stem, Inc., - Ind. App. - , 373 N.E.2d 1116, 1119-20 (1978);
City of Indianapolis v. Central R.R., - Ind. App. - , 369 N.E.2d 1109, 1113 (1977); Saint
Joseph's College v. Morrison, Inc., 158 Ind. App. 292, 302 N.E.2d 865, 870 (1973). But see Young
v. Redman, 55 Cal. App. 3d 827, 838-39, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86, 93-94 (1976) (in absence of statute,
trial courts do not have discretion to impose attorneys' fees for bad faith). See Note, supra note
123, at 338-43 (criticizing Young v. Redman and arguing for the application of the bad faith excep-
tion at the state level).
A few states have codified the bad faith exception. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-1404
(1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 41 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, §§ 6,
F, G. (Michie/Law. Coop. Supp. 1982); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 814.025 (West Supp. 1982). See
generally Sundby, Awarding Reasonable Attorney Fees Upon Frivolous Claims and Counterclaims
Under § 814.025, Stats., 53 Wis. B. BULL., May 1980, at 11. The scope of these statutes is not as
broad as the federal bad faith exception. See Note, supra note 123, at 332-35. A number of other
states have trial rules that permit the imposition of attorneys' fees for various types of bad faith.
See, e.g., Harden v. Widovich, 361 Mich. 422, 105 N.W.2d 224 (1960); Jensen v. Arntzen, 67
Wash. 2d 202, 406 P.2d 954 (1965).
126. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Owens, 565 P.2d 4 (Okla. 1977).
In a hybrid exception having features of both the bad faith and the prior litigation exceptions,
state and federal courts award attorneys' fees incurred in a prior action in which an insurance
company breached its duty to defend. See, e.g., Siegel v. William E. Bookhultz & Sons, Inc., 419
F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Brokers Title Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1174
(E.D. Pa. 1979); New Jersey Mfg. Indem. Ins. Co. v. United States Casualty Co., 91 N.J. Super.
404, 220 A.2d 708 (1966). Cf. Davis v. National Pioneer Ins. Co., 515 P.2d 580, 583-84 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1973) (attorneys' fees not imposed for insurer's failure to settle within policy limits); MFA
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Keller, - Ark. - , 623 S.W.2d 841 (1981) (attorneys' fees awarded to insured
in action against insurer over disputed claim, pursuant to Arkansas statute authorizing awards of
attorneys' fees in actions against insurance companies).
127. See Note, supra note 123, at 332. In diversity cases, a federal court is to follow the state
rule on award of attorneys' fees. Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31
(1975).
128. See, e.g., F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974) (noting that a
court may award attorneys' fees "to a successful party when his opponent has acted in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons" (emphasis added)), cited with approval in Road-
way Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980) and Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soci-
ety, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975). See also Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 640-42
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980).
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when the bad faith was unrelated to the merits of the case. 129
The bad faith exception includes instances of bad faith occurring during
litigation and bad faith conduct that precedes litigation. 130 The exception em-
braces three variants of misconduct, all of which constitute abuse of the judi-
cial system: obdurate or obstinate conduct that necessitates legal action; bad
faith in propounding a frivolous claim, counterclaim, or defense; and vexa-
tious conduct occurring during the course of litigation.
1. Prelitigation Misconduct
The branch of the bad faith exception that has the broadest potential ap-
plication focuses on the prelitigation conduct of the defendant. The prelitiga-
tion conduct that traditionally has given rise to an award of attorneys' fees is
obstinacy in the face of a clearly valid claim. When the defendant resists the
plaintiff's clearly established right without justification for doing so, his obsti-
nacy gives the plaintiff no choice but to seek judicial assistance in enforcing his
right.' 3 ' In such cases, shifting fees "recognizes the unfairness of imposing the
costs of litigation on the party who should have freely enjoyed his rights."'
132
An illustrative case is Vaughan v. Atkinson, 133 in which a seaman brought
suit in admiralty against his former employer when the employer failed with-
out justification to respond to his claim for maintenance and cure. Although
the Supreme Court awarded the seaman attorneys' fees under the rubric of
compensatory damages, 134 it emphasized the role that defendant's bad faith
had played in causing those damages. The Court stated that as a result of
defendant's callous attitude and recalcitrance in neither admitting nor denying
the claim, plaintiff had been forced to hire an attorney to get what was plainly
owed to him under well-settled law.135
Plaintiff Vaughan's mere incurrences of attorneys' fees for purposes of
pressing his claim, however, could not have been the central factor militating
for the inclusion of attorneys' fees in compensatory damages. If defendant
had opposed Vaughan's claim on the merits after careful investigation,
Vaughan would still have been put to the expense of hiring a lawyer to press
his claim. The cost of the employer's denial of the claim would have been the
same had the claim been honestly disputed, but the court presumably would
129. See McEntaggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943
(1972) (fees imposed on prevailing party for bad faith refusal to release information); Marston v.
American Employers Ins. Co., 439 F.2d 1035, 1042 (Ist Cir. 1971) (fees imposed on defendants
who asserted meritorious defense for delay and assertion of a frivolous defense). See also Weaver
v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1356, 1362 (3rd Cir. 1981) (en band) (costs of appeal and posttrial proceedings
imposed on prevailing party for failure to raise an issue in a timely manner).
130. Huecker v. Milburn, 538 F.2d 1241, 1245 n.9 (6th Cir. 1976).
131. Note, supra note 123, at 325.
132. Comment, supra note 2, at 661.
133. 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
134. Id at 530.
135. Id at 530-31.
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not have awarded attorney's fees to Vaughan.13 6 Such an award would have
been tantamount to the dismantling of the American rule in favor of a new
rule allowing the award of attorneys' fees to any prevailing party. Thus, the
conduct warranting the award of fees in Vaughan was conduct that necessi-
tated litigation when none should have been required.
137
When a defendant causes unnecessary litigation by unjustifiably resisting
an indisputable claim, he creates unwarranted expenses not only for his oppo-
nent, but for the public and the courts as well. 138 Clearly established rights
should be respected and accorded without the intervention of a formal deci-
sion maker. The gravamen of the sin of obstinacy is the wasting of private and
judicial resources. The imposition of attorneys' fees as a sanction for obsti-
nacy is both compensatory and punitive or admonitory. 139 In this respect, the
award of attorneys' fees for bad faith can be likened to remedial fines imposed
by a court for civil contempt.140 Such an award "vindicate[s] the. . . Court's
authority over a recalcitrant litigant" and gives the defendant an incentive to
see that further protracted litigation will not be necessary.'
4'
The obstinacy branch of the bad faith exception proved especially useful
in financing litigation in constitutional cases in which nonmonetary relief was
sought and no statute authorizing attorneys' fees had yet been passed. 142 For
example, in Bell v. School Board"43 defendant school board had maintained
rigidly segregated schools and had made no progress toward integration de-
spite the number of years that had elapsed since Brown v. Board of Educa-
ion."44 In fact, it had resisted the transfer of black students by creating
complicated transfer procedures that in practice applied only to blacks. In
granting injunctive relief and awarding attorneys' fees to plaintiffs, the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit took into account the long pattern of evasion
and obstruction on the part of defendant, '45which included pretextuous invo-
cation of discriminatory rules and specious objections to plaintiffs' exercise of
their rights. 146 In Bell, defendant's misconduct included two discrete types of
bad faith: bad faith in creating the original dispute by denying plaintiffs their
constitutional rights (nonlitigation conduct) and bad faith in rebuffing plain-
tiffs' claims for redress of their grievances, which caused litigation that should
136. WalthaU, Award of Attorneys' Fees in the Absence of Statute: Trends and Prospects in the
Fifth Circuit, 10 CuM. L. REv. 359, 371 (1979).
137. See also Bradley v. School Bd., 345 F.2d 310, 321 (4th Cir. 1965); Gates v. Collier, 70
F.R.D. 341 (N.D. Miss. 1976); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 385 F. Supp. 1266 (D.P.R. 1974).
138. Haycroft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d 128, 133 (6th Cir. 1979).
139. See Huecker v. Milburn, 538 F.2d 1241, 1245 n.9 (6th Cir. 1976).
140. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691 (1978). Defendant's obstinacy was found in its failure
to remedy constitutional violations that had been found in an earlier case.
141. Id
142. Walthall, supra note 136, at 370. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), has since been enacted. The Act provides for the award of attorneys' fees
to a party other than the United States in any action to enforce federal civil rights laws.
143. 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963).
144. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
145. 321 F.2d at 500.
146. Id at 497.
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not have been necessary (prelitigation conduct). Under the facts of Bell it
would have been nearly impossible to separate the two types of misconduct,
since an ongoing, consistent pattern of obstinacy had been established.
147
Nevertheless, Bell opened the door for considerable expansion in the applica-
tion of the bad faith exception to nonlitigation conduct.
A questionable illustration of the application of the bad faith exception to
nonlitigation conduct is NAACP v. .4llen.'48 In Allen plaintiffs brought suit
against the Director of the Alabama Department of Public Safety and the Per-
sonnel Director of the Alabama Personnel Department under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging the unconstitutional exclusion of blacks from employment in
the Department of Public Service. In addition to ordering injunctive relief, the
federal district court awarded plaintiffs attorneys' fees under the bad faith and
private attorney general149 exceptions. The finding of bad faith was based on
evidence that "in the thirty-seven-year history of the Alabama Trooper organi-
zation there has never been a black trooper, and the only Negroes ever em-
ployed by the department have been nonmerit system laborers."' 0 In
response to defendants' argument that they had been unsuccessful in their
good faith attempt to hire blacks, the court stated that in view of defendants'
understanding that discriminatory acts were unconstitutional, their mainte-
nance of a defense to the lawsuit amounted to unreasonable and obdurate
conduct.' 5 ' Thus, the41len court based its award of attorneys' fees solely on
bad faith nonlitigation conduct that had given rise to the cause of action. The
court seems to have said that if one has erred, one has no right to defend a
lawsuit relating to that error.
Although the Supreme Court later stated that a court may assess attor-
neys' fees "when the losing party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wan-
tonly, or for oppressive reasons,' "152 this language does not encompass the
rationale of Bell. An award of attorneys' fees against a defendant for acting in
bad faith in causing the original dispute functions very differently from an
award of fees for unjustifiably opposing a clear claim. The expansion of the
bad faith exception to embrace bad faith inherent in the cause of action itself
could open the door to fee shifting in the ordinary tort or contract case.
An award of fees for unjustifiably opposing an indisputable claim serves
147. Other courts have found bad faith in a pattern of violations of well-established constitu-
tional rights, including resistance to redress. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 522 F.2d 81, 82-83 (5th
Cir. 1975) (Tuttle, J., dissenting); Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 453 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1972)
(school desegregation), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945 (1973); Gates v. Collier, 70 F.R.D. 341 (N.D.
Miss. 1976) (awarding fees on remand) (prison conditions); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835,
853-57 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (prison conditions); Burnaman v. Bay City Indep. School Dist., 445 F.
Supp. 927, 939 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (clear violation .of procedural due process).
148. 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aj7'd, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
149. Id at 708-10. See supra note 11 for a discussion of the private attorney generalexception.
150. Id at 708. For a discussion of Allen as it relates to the application of an objective stan-
dard for bad faith, see Walthall, supra note 136, at 384.
151. 340 F. Supp. at 708.
152. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975) (quoting F.D.
Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)) (emphasis added).
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to protect the judicial system as an institution against unwarranted expendi-
tures of its resources. Such an award is a necessary exercise of the supervisory
and equitable powers of the court. A fee award against the defendant for bad
faith in provoking the original dispute, however, punishes the defendant for
his role in the substance of the dispute. This is tantamount to an award of
punitive damages.
153
Although such an award arguably falls within the courts' equitable pow-
ers, the punishment inflicted presents a potentially confusing overlap with the
law of punitive damages. 154 If attorneys' fees are appropriate under the bad
faith exception any time a defendant causes a dispute by his bad faith conduct,
attorneys' fees should be available in any case in which punitive damages are
presently awarded. 155 In fact, if bad faith for purposes of awarding attorneys'
fees to prevailing plaintiffs is judged by an objective standard, attorneys' fees
should be awarded in any case in which a defendant should have known that
he was violating the legally protected interests of another. Such an expansive
application of the bad faith exception would amount to the judicially created
authorization of the award of attorneys' fees to almost any prevailing party.
The Supreme Court clearly does not sanction such an expansive applica-
tion of the bad faith exception. In Feischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brew-
ing Co. 156 the Court held that defendant's deliberate violation of plaintiff's
trademark did not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the Ameri-
can rule. 157 In Runyon v. McCrary158 plaintiffs argued that an award of attor-
neys' fees under the bad faith exception was warranted because defendant had
denied that it had discriminated against plaintiffs. 159 The Court rejected this
application of bad faith, stating that the mere determination of fact against a
defendant did not prove the threshold of irresponsible conduct for which a
penalty would be justified.160 These cases and others from the lower federal
courts suggest that the bad faith exception for prelitigation conduct should
153. See Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 599-600 (3rd Cir. 1976); Refino v. Feuer
Transp., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 562, 568-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), a 'd, 633 F.2d 205 (1980).
154. See Oakes, Introduction: .4 Brief Glance at Attorney's Fees After Alyeska, 2 W. NEW ENG.
L. REv. 169, 175-76 (1979) (Introduction to Symposium on Attorneys Fees).
155. Punitive damages are imposed for a broad range of conduct, ranging from "'oppression,
fraud, or malice' on the one extreme to 'rudeness' or 'mere caprice' on the other." Long, Punitive
Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. Rav. 870, 881 (1976). The nearer a defendant's
state of mind comes to a subjective perception of the risk of harm to another, the more likely it is
that punitive damages will be awarded. See D. DOBBS, supra note 74, § 3.9, at 205-06. See Malor
& Roberts, Punitive Damages.: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTiNGs L.J. 639, 650-63
(1980).
156. 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
157. Id at 720. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had characterized defendants' infringing
activities as deliberate. Id at 715-16.
158. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
159. Id at 183.
160. Id at 183-84. The Court quoted the court of appeals decision approvingly: "Faults in
perception or memory often account for differing trial testimony, but that has not yet been thought
a sufficient ground to shift the expense of litigation." Id at 184. See also Anderson v. Thompson,
495 F. Supp. 1256, 1269 (E.D. Wis. 1980), aft'd, 658 F.2d 1205 (1981) (fact that school had not
done all that it might to further interests of child with special educational interests not sufficient to
establish bad faith).
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require some type of misconduct beyond a determination of fault or error, or
even malice, in the facts that give rise to the cause of action.' 61 They suggest
that courts should focus on whether the defendant had a reasonable basis-in
fact or in law-for opposing the plaintiff's claim.1
62
The bad faith exception should not be applied to permit fee shifting in the
garden variety tort or breach of contract case in which the only bad faith is
that inherent in the cause of action itself. Adequate deterrence to such con-
duct and adequate incentive to sue already exist through the availability of
compensatory and punitive damages.' 63 Furthermore, even though a defend-
161. See, e.g., Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072
(1979) (although defendant's nonlitigation conduct "intolerable," there was no showing of bad
faith in defending the suit); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 599-600 (3d Cir. 1976) (re-
versing award of attorney's fees in lOb-5 action when bad faith existed solely in acts which gave
rise to the cause of action); Cordeco Dev. Corp. v. Santiago Vasquez, 539 F.2d 256, 262-63 (lst
Cir.) (conduct giving rise to lawsuit insufficient for bad faith), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978 (1976);
Wright v. Hezier Corp., 503 F. Supp. 802, 811-15 (N.D. I. 1980). But see Note, Recovery of
Attorney's Fees Under Rule 10b-5, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 320, 336-42 (1977) (criticizing Straub),
162. Compare Gates v. Collier, 70 F.R.D. 341, 345 (N.D. Miss. 1976) ("It remains evident that,
in view of the settled state of the law at the time of commencement of this action, Gates v. Collier
was an action which need not have been brought; or if brought, most certainly need not have been
prolonged to the extent that it was.") with Stokes v. Lecce, 384 F. Supp. 1039, 1051 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
(defendant's defense not in bad faith because substantive issue a close one).
The finding of bad faith in "act complained of' conduct in Allen and other constitutional
cases may be explained by the fact that prior to 1976, a gap existed in federal legislation authoriz-
ing fee shifting in civil rights cases. See, e.g., Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 453 F.2d 259 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945 (1972); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir.
1951); Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Ky. 1976). Fee awards were authorized for prevail-
ing plaintiffs in actions brought under the modern civil rights acts, but not for actions brought
under the Reconstruction civil rights act. Zarcone v. Perry, 438 F. Supp. 788, 792 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)
(appendixing statement of purpose for Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act), aI'd, 581 F.2d
1039 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a-3(b), 2000e-5(k) (1981); Civil Rights Act of 1968 tit. VIII, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981); Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1978) (repealed 1978);
Equal Employment Amendments of 1972,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) (1981); Voting Rights Act Ex-
tension of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(l)(e) (1976).
The private attorney general exception and the bad faith exception provided the means of
reducing financial barriers to private enforcement. Zarcone, 438 F. Supp. at 793-94. Fee shifting
in such situations was of great importance, in view of the fact that nonmonetary relief was fre-
quently sought. Zarcone, 581 F.2d at 1043. See also Walthall, supra note 136, at 370. Absent
some sanction greater than injunctive relief, a defendant had every incentive to delay the redress
of constitutional violations. See Gates, 70 F.R.D. at 345; Bradley v. School Bd., 345 F.2d 310, 324
(4th Cir. 1965) (Sobeloff & Bell, JJ., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
In light of these circumstances, judges had understandable incentive to expand the bad faith
exception. See, e.g., Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Ky. 1976) (§ 1982 case decided after
Alyeska but several months before the effective date of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act). The case involved a clear instance of wrongful refusal to rent on the basis of race. The court
awarded attorneys' fees in addition to compensatory and punitive damages, noting that "[blad
faith may be found in the actions that led to the lawsuit." Id at 288. Although there was no bad
faith found in the conduct of the litigation, the court focused on the fact that the state of the law
was well-established at the time of the act complained of. Defendant's violation of well-settled
law established bad faith. Id Significantly, the court remarked "of course, 42 U.S.C. § 1982
contains no provisions for attorney's fees, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, which contains such
a provision, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(e), does not apply here." Id Since the passage of the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, which provides for the award of attorneys' fees to prevailing
parties in suits to enforce civil rights laws enacted since 1866, extension of the bad faith exception
should not be necessary to enforce constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1981).
163. See, eg., Zarcone, 581 F.2d at 1044; Fort v. White, 530 F.2d 1113, 1118 (2d Cir. 1976).
At least one state court has awarded attorneys' fees as an explicit measure of punitive dam-
ages in a tort case. See Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 496 P.2d 682 (1972). Courts frequently
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ant may have acted in bad faith or with malice in the original dispute, he may
have a reasonable legal or factual basis for contesting the suit against him. At
least one important issue-damages--ordinarily will not be clear before trial.
He should not, therefore, be punished for merely defending the suit.
An even more worrisome expansion of the bad faith exception is found in
cases in which attorneys' fees have been awarded under the bad faith excep-
tion when the plaintiff's rights have not been clearly defined by well-settled
law at the time the lawsuit was filed. In Fairley v. Patterson 164 plaintiffs were
awarded attorneys' fees under the bad faith exception and the private attorney
general exception, despite the delayed resolution of the substantive issues of
the case after extensive litigation, including a series of appeals. 165 Although
Fairley and other cases of its kind I66 may be of limited authority because they
predated statutory authorization for the award of attorneys' fees, 16 7 they form
dangerous precedents to the extent that they authorize fee shifting when the
plaintiff's rights have not been clearly established at the time the lawsuit was
filed.
Such an extension of the bad faith exception, if applied generally, would
amount to the abrogation of the American rule. As one writer has stated:
If the justification for the no-fee rule partially lies in policies favoring
allocation of litigation decisions (including the decision to sue or de-
fend) to the parties, a decision to resist a claim based on indisputable
legal authority may nevertheless lie outside the range of permissible
decisions open to a party. Thus, the award of attorneys' fees where a
defendant, as in Vaughan or in Bell, has resisted such claim would
not run counter to the policies underlying the no-fee rule. '
68
By contrast, the imposition of attorneys' fees on a party who has opposed
an unestablished and disputable claim would violate the policies underlying
the American rule. Such fee awards would impair free access to the courts for
that defendant by increasing the risk of litigation. This, in turn, would
threaten the development and refinement of the substantive law.
Courts have a strong interest in promoting the efficient use of their re-
sources by punishing and deterring unwarranted use of the courts. This inter-
est militates for the imposition of sanctions whether the plaintiff has caused
consider attorneys' fees as one factor in determining the amount of punitive damages to be
awarded. Owen, Punitive Damages in Product Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1315,
1319 (1976). The Supreme Court stated in an early case, however, that attorneys' fees could not be
awarded as a measure of compensatory or punitive damages. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 363, 371 (1851).
164. 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974).
165. WaIthall, supra note 136, at 377-78.
166. See also Dyer v. Love, 307 F. Supp. 974, 986 (N.D. Miss. 1969). Cf Sims v. Amos, 340
F. Supp. 691, 693-94 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (legislature's failure to act would be bad faith, but fee
award based on broader, equitable grounds), aft'dmem., 409 U.S. 942 (1972). See Walthall, supra
note 136, at 375-79 for a more detailed discussion of these cases. But See Lytle v. Commissioners
of Election, 65 F.R.D. 699, 701-02 (D.S.C. 1975) (no evidence in malapportionment case to sup-
port finding that defendant litigated in bad faith or that defense was offered without any possible
basis in law or fact).
167. Voting Rights Act Extension of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 1973()(e) (1976).
168. Walthall, supra note 136, at 375.
1983]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
unwarranted expenditures by filing a frivolous claim or whether the defendant
has caused litigation by his obstinate refusal to accord the plaintiff clearly-
owed rights. In fact, use of the bad faith exception to sanction a defendant's
obstinacy is an indispensible weapon for the protection of judicial economy
because there is no common law tort action akin to malicious prosecution that
applies to specious defenses.
169
If courts are committed to maintaining the American rule as a general
principle, however, they must take care to contain the bad faith exception to
prelitigation conduct that bears a close relationship to the unwarranted use of
the courts' resources. The exception should apply only in cases in which the
defendant's bad faith is shown by unjustified opposition or inaction in the face
of a clearly established claim on the part of the plaintiff.1
70
2. Substantive Bad Faith: The Assertion of Frivolous Claims,
Counterclaims, and Defenses
One criticism of the American rule frequently encountered is that the gen-
eral no-fee rule fails to deter-and even encourages-frivolous litigation.' 7 1
Not only does the assertion of a groundless claim cause financial and emo-
tional harm to the target of that claim, 172 it wastes judicial resources and
threatens the prestige of the judicial system as well.' 73 As one court stated,
"Sufficient abuse of the judicial process could overwhelm the courts and de-
stroy the judicial system as an effective branch of government. This. . . the
courts have a constitutional duty to prevent."1
7 4
Like the common-law causes of action for malicious prosecution17 5 and
wrongful civil proceedings, 176 the application of this branch of the bad faith
exception is designed to compensate, punish, and deter the harm done to
169. See Note, supra note 6, at 79.
170. In almost every instance in which fees have been awarded under the prelitigation branch
of the bad faith exception, the existence of bad faith on the part of the defendant has been deter-
mined by the use of an objective standard. Walthall, supra note 136, at 383-84. Courts inquire
whether the plaintiff's claim was well-established in law so as to render the defendant's opposition
specious, but do not inquire into the existence of an improper motive on the part of the defendant.
The standard for determining bad faith shifts to a subjective one when the conduct complained of
is the assertion of a frivolous claim. See infra text accompanying notes 171-213.
171. Ehrenzweig, supra note 4, at 797; Kuenzel, supra note 4, at 78. See also J. LIEBERMAN,
supra note 15, at 176-78.
172. See Comment, Nemeroff v. Abelson, Bad Faith, andA wards of Autorneys'Fees, 128 U. PA.
L. REv. 468, 485 n.100 (1979) (comparing the damage caused by a groundless lawsuit to the dam-
age caused by slander).
173. Note, supra note 18, at 798.
174. Copeland v. Martinez, 603 F.2d 981, 992 n.69 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (awarding fees to United
States as prevailing defendant under common-law bad faith exception for groundless Title VII
case), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980).
175. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 (1977). See generally W. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS § 119 (4th ed. 1971); Note, Groundless Litigation andthe Malicious Prosecution Debate.,
A HistoricalAnalysis, 88 YALE L.J. 1218 (1979).
176. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 (1977); W. PROSSER, supra note
175, § 120. While the torts of malicious prosecution and wrongful civil proceedings are distin-
guishable-the first involves the instigation of criminal proceedings and the second involves the
instigation of civil proceedings--courts frequently use the term "malicious prosecution" to refer to
both. The term will be used in this generic manner for the remainder of this article.
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courts and private parties by the assertion of frivolous claims. 177 The bad
faith exception theoretically decreases the risks of groundless litigation, in that
one who files a groundless claim can be held responsible for the portion of the
opponent's expenses attributable to his defense of the bad faith claim, 178 or
even for all of the expenses of the defense of the lawsuit if bad faith pervades
the entire suit.
17 9
The common-law substantive branch of the bad faith exception walks the
same tightrope between conflicting social policies as does the tort of malicious
prosecution. Both attempt to remedy and discourage abuse of the judicial sys-
tem without impeding free access to the courts for meritorious claims.180 Ac-
commodating these two goals is difficult and results in a weakening of both
branches as potential deterrents to frivolous claims.
The major challenge facing courts in their application of this branch of
the bad faith exception is to develop a workable standard for determining the
existence of bad faith. A review of the relevant cases indicates that although
courts apply an objective standard for the bad faith exception to defendants'
prelitigation conduct,' 8 ' they require much more to establish bad faith on the
part of a party (usually a plaintiff) for his assertion of a substantive claim or
defense. Although there is a mountain of authority supporting the power of
courts to impose attorneys' fees for substantive bad faith,' 8 2 there is a veritable
dearth of appellate cases in which fees have actually been imposed on a party
for his assertion of a groundless claim.'
83
One of these rare cases is Ellingson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 184 in
which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an award of attorneys' fees
against plaintiff based on the district court's finding that plaintiff had abused
the judicial process and harassed defendants. 85 Plaintiffs bad faith was
shown by his filing of a new suit against defendants, based on sham pleadings
that contained false allegations, some twenty years after the issue had been
177. Note, Prevailing Defendant Fee Awards in Civil Rights Litigation: A Growing Threat to
Private Enforcement, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 75, 111 (1982). See Mallen, An Attorney's Liability for
Malicious Prosecution, A Misunderstood Tort, 46 INs. CouNs. J. 407, 409 (1979). For a discussion
of the analogy between the bad faith exception and malicious prosecution, see Comment, Awards
of Attorneys' Fees Against Attorneys: Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 60 B.U.L. REv. 950, 962
n.107 (1980); Comment, supra note 172, at 481-83.
178. Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 181 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Brown-
ing Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1088-89 (2d Cir. 1977).
179. See, e.g., Ellingson v. Burlington N., Inc., 653 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1981) (awarding fees
for defense of main action and appeal); Fisher v. Fashion Inst. of Technology, 87 F.R.D. 485
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Scheriffv. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254, 1257-58 (D. Colo. 1978).
180. See authorities cited supra at note 177.
181. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Roadway Express Co. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.
v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116
(1974); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967). See also authori-
ties collected at 6 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORf's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 54.77[2]
(2d ed. 1982).
183. These cases are to be distinguished from those involving statutory attorneys' fee awards
for prevailing defendants. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
184. 653 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1981).
185. Id at 1331-32.
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resolved against him in a proceeding before the Interstate Commerce
Commission.186
This unusual case leaves unanswered the question of what conduct, short
of filing sham pleadings and relitigating an issue that is res judicata, will at-
tract an award of attorneys' fees for a plaintiff's substantive bad faith. The
weight of authority indicates that a claim will not be found to have been so
meritless as to justify an award of fees if it was colorable when instituted.1
87
An award of fees may not be justified even if the party's claim appears to
lack factual merit at the time the case is filed. In Nemeroff v. Abelson 188 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturned an award of fees that had been
imposed on plaintiff and his law firm' 89 for having filed a lawsuit when the
evidence gathered by the attorneys before they filed suit consisted of inadmis-
sible and irrelevant evidence that the district court had characterized as "only
rumor and gossip."'190 In reversing the fee award, the court of appeals stated:
A claim is colorable for purposes of the bad faith exception, when it
has some legal and factual support, considered in light of the reason-
able beliefs of the individual making the claim. The question is
whether a reasonable attorney could have concluded that facts sup-
porting the claim might be established, not whether such facts actu-
ally had been established.191
This standard for bad faith appears to validate a "fishing expedition" in which
the plaintiff files suit first, and later determines the facts. In Health-Chem
Corp. v. Hyman 192 the court commented that failing to investigate before trial
would not in itself constitute bad faith, since the questioning of opposing par-
ties probably could not be accomplished without the aid of compulsory
process. 193
Even the assertion of claims that appear to be without reasonable legal
186. Although plaintiff was held to have waived the issue of the award of attorneys' fees on
appeal by failing to raise it in his brief, the court stated that the lower court's award of fees was
proper. Id The court also imposed fees on plaintiff for his prosecution of a meritless appeal,
stating that "[a] frivolous lawsuit does not become meritorious when appealed." Id at 1332.
187. See, e.g., Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980); Browning Debenture Holders Comm. v.
DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1088 (2d Cir. 1977); Americana Indus. v. Wometco de P.R., Inc., 556
F.2d 625, 628 (Ist Cir. 1977); Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein, 481 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1144 (1974); Health-Chem Corp. v. Hyman, 523 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Cambridge
Fund, Inc. v. Abella, 501 F. Supp. 598, 632-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Driscoll v. Oppenheimer & Co.,
500 F. Supp. 174 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Medtronics, Inc. v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 468 F. Supp.
1132, 1149 (D. Minn. 1979).
Certainly, if the party asserting the defense or claim prevails on the merits, there can be no
finding of substantive bad faith. Foley v. Devaney, 528 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1976). Procedural bad
faith can still be found on the part.of a prevailing party, however. See Lmiosg, 663 F.2d at 182
("[E]ven a winner may have to pay obstinacy fees.").
188. 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980). See generally Comment, supra note 172.
189. See infra notes 223-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the imposition of attor-
neys' fees on attorneys.
190. Nemeroffv. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),aFdinpart, rev'dinpart and
remanded, 620 F.2d 339 
(2d Cir. 1980).
191. 620 F.2d at 348. Accord Health-Chem Corp. v. Hyman, 523 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
192. 523 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
193. Id at 31.
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merit is apparently insufficient to justify the imposition of fees for substantive
bad faith. In Miracle Mile Associates v. City of Rochester 194 the lessees and
developers of a proposed shopping area brought an antitrust suit against the
City of Rochester, city officials, and a commercial competitor. Plaintiffs had
brought a similar action against other competitors based on the same theory of
recovery and had lost. The district court awarded attorneys' fees to the current
defendants, finding that plaintiffs' claim was frivolous and made in bad
faith. 195 Despite the appellate court's conclusion that plaintifl' legal claim
was even weaker against the current defendants, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed the district court's award of fees. 196 The court of ap-
peals rejected the contention that plaintiffs' bad faith was shown by the fact
that the merits of its case were even weaker than were the merits of its other
suit in which ultimate recovery was barred.197 The court stated that "[t]he
mere fact that an action is without merit does not amount to bad faith."19
8
Even though plaintiffs had been unsuccessful in the previous case when repre-
sented by the same counsel, the court pointed out that the instant action in-
volved a different project and different proceedings. 199
This case illustrates the contrast between the standard for bad faith ap-
plied to defendants for their prelitigation conduct and that applied to plaintiffs
for substantive bad faith. A defendant charged with obstinacy in unjustifiably
opposing a clear claim surely could not defeat the imposition of fees by argu-
ing that although the law was well-settled by existing precedents, he might be
successful in a different proceeding. Miracle Mile stands for the proposition
that "bad faith" is not synonymous with "meritless." It suggests that some bad
intent is required for a finding of bad faith, and furthermore, that the intent
component cannot be inferred from the absence of merit in the party's claim.
In a frequently cited case, Browning Debenture Holders' Committee v. DASA
Corporation,20° the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that substantive
bad faith required clear evidence that the claim was entirely without color and
that it was made for reasons of harassment, delay, or for some other improper
purpose.20
1
Thus, the finding of substantive bad faith requires a two-step analysis of
the claimant's conduct. First, an objective analysis is made to determine
whether the claim had any legal or factual merit.202 If the claim is found to
have been colorable, the inquiry ends and the assertion of the substantive
194. 617 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980).
195. Id at 19.




200. 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977).
201. Id at 1088.
202. This inquiry would parallel the element of lack of probable cause in malicious prosecu-
tion actions. In malicious prosecution, lack of probable cause is a matter of law to be determined
by an objective standard. Mallen, supra note 177, at 419; Note, Liabilityfor Proceeding with Un-
founded Litigation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 743, 748 (1980).
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claim or defense cannot have been made in bad faith.20 3 If the claim is found
to have been without merit, a court would use a subjective standard to deter-
mine whether there was evidence of improper purpose on the part of the liti-
gant.2°4 Because the confluence of objective lack of merit and subjective
improper purpose is difficult to establish,205 one must conclude that the stan-
dard for bad faith is rigorous and will be exercised only in extreme cases.
20 6
Several courts have indicated that the rigorous subjective standard is nec-
essary to ensure that plaintiffs with meritorious or colorable but novel claims
are not deterred from bringing suit.20 7 The underlying theory is that since
"[t]oday's frivolity may be tomorrow's law," 208 it is very difficult, particularly
for a layman, to evaluate in advance whether his claim has merit. Lest those
who have meritorious claims be chilled in their access to the judicial process,
courts must confine the sanction of imposing attorneys' fees to those who
should know, because of their improper motives, that the suit is impermissible.
The use of a less restrictive standard in some statutory cases might be neces-
sary to protect defendants and the courts, especially when the incentive to file
frivolous lawsuits is made greater by the availability of almost automatic stat-
utory awards of attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs. 209 Although in nonstat-
utory cases there is no disincentive to filing a wholly groundless suit on the
outside chance that one might prevail or at least extract a favorable settlement,
the incentive created by the automatic statutory award is absent.
The operation of the subjective standard has restricted the application of
203. See, e.g., Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1980). If a
justifiable claim were asserted for a wrongful purpose, however, the claimant could be liable for
the tort of abuse of process. See Note, supra note 202, at 751; Note, supra note 177, at 112.
204. This inquiry is analogous to the "malice" element of malicious prosecution, which is
determined through the application of a subjective standard. Mallen, supra note 177, at 419; Note,
supra note 202, at 748. Although some courts will permit malice to be inferred from the absence
of probable cause, "the logical viability of the inference depends on the extent of the absence of
probable cause." Mallen, supra note 177, at 419.
Harassment has been mentioned by courts as one possible improper purpose. See, e.,
Browning Debenture Holders' Comm., 560 F.2d at 1088. If the improper purpose test is applied
like the malice test in malicious prosecution, other improper purposes might include the desire to
seek revenge or to do any other unjustified harm to the other party, or indeed, any purpose other
than the recovery and adjudication of a claim. Mallen, supra note 177, at 418-19. One court
stated that it would be possible for a case to be so frivolous as to reflect impermissible conduct for
purposes of the bad faith exception. Americana Indus. v. Wometco de P.R., Inc., 556 F.2d 625,
628 (1st Cir. 1977).
205. An example of this extreme type of conduct is seen in Scheriffv. Beck, 425 F. Supp. 1254
(D. Colo. 1978), in which attorneys' fees were levied against plaintiff for his maintenance of a bad
faith civil rights action against one of the defendants. Plaintiff admitted a plan to harass defend-
ant through litigation and engaged in outrageous conduct toward defendant, both in and out of
court.
206. Health-Chem Corp. v. Hyman, 523 F. Supp. 27, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (following Nemerof,
620 F.2d at 348).
207. Nemeroff, 620 F.2d at 349-50; Browning Debenture Holders' Comm., 560 F.2d at 1088.
208. Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MNN. L. REv. 1, 57 (1976).
209. Certain classes of prevailing plaintiffs may recover attorneys' fees absent special circum-
stances making such an award unjust. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 402
(1968) (standard applied to plaintiffs who obtained injunctive relief under Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964); Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (Newman
standard applicable to Title VII plaintiffs).
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the bad faith exception for substantive bad faith to "nut cases." Since people
who bring groundless lawsuits for purposes of harassment or revenge are not
likely to be proceeding on rational bases anyway, it would seem that they are
not likely to be deterred by the possibility that they may be liable for their
opponents attorneys' fees. In short, the substantive branch of the bad faith
exception is impotent as a deterrent to the bringing of groundless cases so long
as a subjective standard is applied.
210
The balance between maintaining free access to the courts and deterring
groundless claims is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to strike. The formula-
tion of a standard is made more difficult by the inability of litigants to assess
accurately the merit or lack of merit of their claims. Requiring proof of im-
proper motive as a prerequisite to the imposition of sanctions merely serves as
a proxy for the concern that a litigant with a meritorious claim might be de-
terred from asserting it because he feared liability for counsel fees. If this is
the case, it would seem preferable to test directly for good faith belief in the
merits of the case rather than using a more indirect test that scrutinized the
claimant's subjective, underlying motive.
If courts desire to accord more weight to the deterrent goal of the bad
faith exception, they could employ a procedural device that would more effi-
ciently fulfill their objective. 2 11 The determination of bad faith would take the
form of a two-step process very different from the one currently used. First,
the court would scrutinize the claim on an objective basis to determine
whether it was colorable. If it was, the inquiry would end there and no finding
210. The subjective standard employed in the common-law bad faith exception exists in sharp
contrast to the objective test for bad faith applied to unsuccessful plaintiffs under the statutory
authorization of fee awards to prevailing parties in civil rights actions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)
(Supp. V 1981). In Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978), the Supreme Courtrejected the unsuccessful plaintiff's contention that Congress had intended that fees be awarded toprevailing defendants only on a showing that the plaintiff had been motivated by bad faith inbringing the action. The Court stated that if bad faith had been the intent of Congress, the statu-
tory provision would have been unnecessary, "for it has long been established that even under theAmerican c mm n-law rule attor ey's fees may be awarded against a party who has proceeded 
in
bad faith." Idt at 419.
The Court found the subjective standard for bad faith inappropriate 
in Title VII actions
because the legislative history of the statute indicated that the purpose 
of permitting fee awards to
prevailing defendants was to discourage frivolous lawsuits and protect defendants from burden-some itigation that had no factual or legal basis. b at 420-21. 
The Court concluded that a
district court may award attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant in 
a Title VII case on a finding
that the plaintiff's action was "frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, 
even though it was
not brought in subjective bad faith." Id at 421; see also Runyon v. 
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 183
(1976). In applying this objective standard, the Court cautioned trial 
ourts not to engage in ctost
hoc reasoning" and conclude that a plaintifi's action must have been 
unreasonable simply because
he did not prevail, for this would discourage all but the most airtight 
of cases. Id at 421-22. This
objective standard of bad faith has been employed as a basis for 
awarding fees to prevailing
defendants in a number of cases. See, e.g., Fisher v. Fashion Inst. of 
Technology, 87 F.R.D. 485
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Flora v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (fees assessed against LegalServices Corporation for procedural bad faith); Scheriffv. Beck, 452 
F. Sup. 1254 (D. Co. 1978)
(ordinarily intent irrelevant, but here plaintiff admitted bad intent). See 
also Note, supra note 177,
103-18 (discussing the prevailing defendant cases and criticizing the 
objective standard as being a
threat to private enforcement).
211. This procedural device has been suggested in two related contexts. 
See Comment, supra
note 177, at 966-67 (regarding attorneys' liability); Comment, supra note 
172, at 482-84 (regarding
the demonstration of good intent on the part of a party).
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of bad faith would be made. If the court found as a matter of law that the
claim lacked any reasonable merit, however, this finding would give rise to a
prima facie case or rebuttable presumption of bad faith on the part of the
party asserting that claim.212 The party asserting the claim would then be
permitted to rebut the presumption with articulable reasons for his belief that
the claim had merit at the time he asserted the claim or at the time he contin-
ued to press the claim after the lack of merit should have become apparent.
213
If the person could demonstrate a good faith belief in the merits of his claim,
based on articulable reasons in fact and law, attorneys' fees should not be
levied against him. If the claim was objectively groundless and the claimant
could demonstrate no basis for having believed it to be meritorious, the court
would find that he acted in bad faith.
The scheme would imbue the bad faith exception with greater power to
deter groundless suits without chilling the potentially meritorious suit. A
claimant would not be subject to sanction so long as he had an articulable
basis in law and fact for believing in the merits of the claim, regardless of
whether he had been objectively correct in his assessment. The redistribution
of the burden of proof would not only make it more feasible to establish the
existence of bad faith, it would also encourage a higher standard of care in
prelitigation research and investigation.
3. Procedural Bad Faith
The last branch of the bad faith exception is insensitive to the merits of
the case in chief and focuses instead on the "methodology of its prosecu-
tion.1214 A party whose vexatious conduct during the course of litigation has
caused unnecessary expenditures by his opponent and the court can be re-
quired to pay the amount of the attorneys' fees attributable to his bad faith
procedural manuevers. 215 Like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, which
permits the imposition of attorneys' fees as a sanction for abuse of the discov-
ery process, and federal rule 41(d), which provides for the discretionary impo-
sition of costs of a previously dismissed complaint, the purpose of this branch
of the bad faith exception is to protect the efficient and orderly administration
of the legal process. 2
16
Procedural rules and practices provide unlimited opportunity for delay
and harrassment, and any procedure can be misused. Examples of procedural
abuse that have warranted the imposition of sanctions for bad faith include
212. See Comment, supra note 172, at 482-84, suggesting the use of summary proceedings
modeled on the practice presently used in motions for summary judgment.
213. Bad faith might consist of continuing to press a meritless case after discovery had shown
it to be factually unfounded. One court indicated that this might be shown when a party has the
opportunity to settle a disputed point through discovery, but refuses to do so. See Snyder v.
Leake, 87 F.R.D. 362, 364-65 (N.D. Miss. 1980).
214. Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
215. Id See also Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1088-
89 (2d Cir. 1977).
216. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-66 (1980).
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the concealment of assets and falsification of records,2 17 the refusal to produce
documents ordered by the court,2 18 the frivolous removal of a case to federal
courts, 2 19 and the launching of extensive discovery aimed at making out a
class action after the court has denied the maintainability of a class action.
220
Although courts have not stated that the standard to be applied in cases of
procedural abuse is different from the subjective standard applied to substan-
tive bad faith,22 1 they do seem much more willing to make a finding of bad
faith on an objective basis when procedural abuse is alleged. The line to be
drawn between aggressive advocacy and abuse is a fine one. One court
commented:
Vigorous advocacy involves conflict and is a natural and expected
byproduct of litigation in our judicial system. It is only conduct that
clearly goes beyond generally accepted vigor and persistence com-
monly employed in our adversary system that may be considered in
determining whether sanctions should be imposed.222
The use of an objective standard that would permit a judge to infer bad
faith from an observation that a procedural maneuver was unduly dilatory or
without reasonable foundation would be justifiable in cases concerning proce-
dural abuse. In cases of procedural abuse judges are in a better position to
observe the parties' conduct first hand. Being experienced in procedural mat-
ters, they readily can compare the litigants' procedural conduct with the norm.
In addition, procedural practices are likely to be governed by more clearly
ascertainable rules and time limits than are substantive principles of law. A
more restrictive test that required proof of subjective improper motive would
not be mandated by the free access policy, since only the parties' procedural
maneuvers, not their substantive claims, are being evaluated. A procedural
maneuver that has some reasonable legal basis will not be sanctioned. Be-
217. First Nat'l Bank v. Dunham, 471 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1973) (fee award not explicitly based
on bad faith exception, but facts would justify fees under both bad faith and prior litigation
exceptions).
218. Red School House, Inc. v. OEO, 386 F. Supp. 1177, 1193 (D. Minn. 1974).
219. Baas v. Elliott, 71 F.R.D. 693 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). Compare Cornwall v. Robinson, 654
F.2d 685 (10th Cir. 1981) [and] Baldwin v. Burger Chef Systems, 507 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1974)
(denying attorneys' fees for removal because no bad faith was found) with Grinnell Bros. v.
Touche, Ross & Co., 655 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1981) (awarding attorneys' fees for removal when case
remanded to state court, holding that a finding of bad faith was not necessary to justify award
because "overriding considerations indicate the need for such recovery," and interpreting Baldwin
as holding that no bad faith was necessary) [and] Kasprowicz v. Capital Credit Corp., 524 F.
Supp. 105 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
220. Flora v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. Miss. 1978); see also, City of Nat1 Bank & Trust
Co. v. Owen, 565 P.2d 4 (Okla. 1977) (plaintiffs bad faith shown by its moving to dismiss its case
without prejudice after it had taken the matter through trial and both parties had rested, allegedly
for the purpose of testing its case); Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 181
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (defendant's bad faith shown by its dilatory tactics during discovery and court
hearings, which included consistent failure to meet scheduled filing deadlines, misuse of discov-
ery, and misleading the court by the misquotation and omission of documentary evidence).
221. One court spoke of the "intent-laden terminology" of the bad faith exception in a case
dealing with an allegedly frivolous removal to federal court and rejected the application of a
negligence standard. Cornwall v. Robinson, 654 F.2d 685, 687 (10th Cir. 1981).
222. Tenants and Owners in Opposition to Redevelopment v. HUD, 406 F. Supp. 960, 964
(N.D. Cal. 1975).
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cause it is easier to assess whether a procedural move is justifiable than
whether a substantive claim is colorable, there would be little reason to fear
the chilling of potentially meritorious motions or practices. Moreover, dila-
tory litigation practices constitute such an extensive and unwarranted use of
judicial resources that it is justifiable to accord judges additional latitude to
deter procedural abuse.
4. Attorneys' Personal Liability for Opponents' Attorney's Fees
In years past, some courts assumed that a lawyer could not be held per-
sonally responsible for harm caused by groundless litigation, since he was act-
ing in a purely representative capacity.223 The malpractice "crisis" of the
1970s prompted increased interest in the possibility of suing attorneys person-
ally for their role in facilitating groundless litigation.224 Most courts now per-
mit causes of action against attorneys for malicious prosecution and abuse of
process, 225 but very few recoveries against attorneys under these theories have
been affirmed at the appellate level.226 Courts have uniformly refused to rec-
ognize any cause of action by opposing parties grounded in negligence. 227
In the 1980 case of Roadway Express, Inc. v. Poer,2 28 however, the
Supreme Court cleared the way for an additional avenue of personal liability
for attorneys. In Roadway two former employees and an unsuccessful job ap-
plicant commenced a civil rights class action against Roadway Express. After
plaintiffs' interrogatories had been answered and defendant's interrogatories
had been served, plaintiffs' attorneys engaged in a pattern of uncooperative
behavior, including failing to appear at a hearing and depositions at scheduled
times, failing to answer interrogatories, and failing to file briefs that had been
ordered, even after the time for filing had been extended by more than seven
weeks.229 The district court dismissed the lawsuit pursuant to a rule 37230
motion filed by defendant, and ordered plaintiffs' attorneys to pay Roadway's
223. See Mallen, supra note 177, at 409.
224. The possible use of common-law tort to stem the flow of malpractice litigation has
prompted a great deal of commentary. See, e.g., Birnbaum, Physicians Counterattack: Liability of
LawyersforlInstituting Unjustfied MedicalMalpractice Actions, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1003 (1977);
Note, Malicious Prosecution: An Effective Attack on Spurious Medical Malpractice Claims?, 26
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 653 (1976); Note, Physician Countersuits: Malicious Prosecution, Defama-
lion and Abuse of Process as Remedies for Meriless Medical Mapractice Suits, 45 U. CINN. L.
Rav. 604 (1976).
At least one state has enacted a statute permitting fee awards to prevailing parties in medical
malpractice cases. See FLA. STAT. § 768.56(1) (Supp. 1980). The statute contains, however, no
authorization for the imposition of fees directly against an attorney. See generally Spence & Roth,
Closing the Courthouse Door: Florida's Spurious Claims Statute, 10 STETSON L. REv. 397 (1981).
225. See, e.g., Ferraris v. Levy, 223 Cal. App. 2d 408, 36 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1963); Berlin v. Na-
than, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978). See also Mallen, supra note 177, at 409.
226. Mallen, supra note 177, at 408; Note, supra note 18, at 775, 781.
227. See, e.g., Bird v. Rothman, 128 Ariz. 599, 627 P.2d 1097 (1981); Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 I11.
App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978).
228. 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
229. Id at 755.
230. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(c) permits a district court to dismiss an action as one of the
possible sanctions for abuse of the discovery process.
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costs and attorneys' fees. The total assessment exceeded $17,000.231 The dis-
trict court justified the fee award by reading together the civil rights attorneys'
fees statutes, which permit the award of fees to prevailing parties,2 32 and 28
U.S.C. § 1927, which authorizes district courts to tax excess "costs" of a pro-
ceeding against a lawyer who "so multiplies the proceedings. . . as to increase
costs unreasonably and vexatiously.
2 33
The Supreme Court rejected the district court's contention that the conflu-
ence of these two statutes provided statutory authority for the assessment of
fees against counsel,234 but it approved in principle such an assessment as an
exercise of the court's inherent powers.2 35 These inherent powers, which "are
necessary for the exercise of all others,"2 36 have been expressed in the con-
tempt sanction, sanctions for abusive litigation practices such as dismissal for
failure to prosecute, and the imposition of attorneys' fees on a party for bad
faith litigation.2 37 The Court concluded that the power of a court over mem-
bers of the bar is at least as great as its power over litigants, and "[i]f a court
may tax counsel fees against a party who has litigated in bad faith, it certainly
may assess those expenses against counsel who willfully abuse judicial pro-
cess." 238 It remanded the case to the district court for a specific finding that
counsel's misconduct constituted bad faith, which the Court stated would be
necessary for a sanction based on the courts' inherent powers.
23 9
The language of Roadway clearly authorizes the assessment of fees
against an attorney for substantive or procedural bad faith.240 The Court did
not, however, specify the standard of bad faith to be applied to an attorney.
As in the formulation of standards to be applied to party litigants, the standard
selected must accommodate the twin goals of deterrence and free access.
2 41
Indeed, the conflict between these goals is heightened when the person sanc-
231. Monk v. Roadway Express, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 411 (W.D. La. 1977), vacated 599 F.2d 1378
(1979), af'd sub. nom. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 761 (1980).
232. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000e-5(k) (Supp. V 1981).
233. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976). See infra note 234 for the text of this statute as amended in
1980.
234. 447 U.S. at 761. Congress promptly amended § 1927 to provide for the levying of costs
and attorneys' fees against recalcitrant lawyers. Act of Sept. 12, 1980, Pub. L. 'No. 96-349, § 3, 94
Stat. 1156 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1927 (Supp. V 1981)). Section 1927 now provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States
or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses,
and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
29 U.S.C. § 1927 (Supp. V 1981).
235. 447 U.S. at 764. The Court also directed the district court to reconsider on remand Road-
way's Rule 37 motion. Id at 763-64. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(e) specifies the award of attorneys'
fees as one possible sanction for abuse of discovery.
236. 447 U.S. at 764.
237. Id at 764-65.
238. Id at 766.
239. Id at 767.
240. "The bad-faith exception for the award of attorney's fees is not restricted to cases where
the action is filed in bad faith. '[B]ad faith may be found, not only in the actions that led to the
lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation.'" Id at 766 (quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15
(1973)).
241. Comment, supra note 177, at 962.
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tioned is a lawyer. Imposing personal liability on the person who determines
litigation tactics and who is most likely to be informed about his legal vulnera-
bility greatly increases the deterrent capabilities of the bad faith exception. At
the same time, a lawyer who is fearful of personal liability may be a "timid
champion" indeed, contrary to his ethical duty of zealous advocacy. 242 If an
attorney fears being held the guarantor of the merits of a client's claim, the
attorney might refuse to prosecute difficult or controversial claims.243 The po-
tential chill on free access to the courts is apparent, for a claimant might not be
able to obtain a competent lawyer to press a close claim.
A negligence standard for determining bad faith on the part of an attor-
ney would not properly accommodate these competing interests. Holding a
lawyer to the standard of a reasonable attorney in evaluating the merits of a
case or a procedural maneuver might lead to such uncertainty that the attor-
ney would prefer to be on the safe side and decline to take the case.244 Such a
standard would increase deterrence at the expense of free access.245 Further-
more, the Supreme Court may have foreclosed the application of a negligence
standard. In Roadway the Court noted that New York courts impose costs
and fines on attorneys for mere negligence, but "this opinion addresses only
bad-faith conduct. '246 It further stated that a finding of bad faith would have
to precede any sanction under the court's inherent powers,247 and spoke of an
attorney "willfully" abusing the judicial process.248
Conversely, a "malice" or subjective improper purpose standard would
unduly exalt the free access policy at the cost of severely limiting any deterrent
force behind the bad faith exception.249 This is particularly true for lawyers
because the usual unsavory motivations that a lawyer would have for pressing
meritless suits or engaging in vexatious procedural maneuvers-procuring a
fee at any cost, extracting a favorable settlement in a groundless "nuisance"
suit, or even simple incompetence-are not considered to be improper mo-
tives, at least in the analogous areas of malicious prosecution and abuse of
process. 250 Furthermore, a malice standard would have a divisive effect on the
242. Thode, The Groundless Case-The Lawyer'r Tort Duty to His Client and to the Adverse
Party, 11 ST. MARY'S LJ. 59, 74 (1979).
243. See Mallen, supra note 177, at 409.
244. Comment, supra note 177, at 964-65.
245. Id
246. 447 U.S. at 767 n.13.
247. Id It should be noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1927, as amended, permits the imposition of attor-
neys' fees on counsel who have "unreasonably" extended the proceedings. See supra note 234.
This language can be construed to permit imposition of fees in federal courts for procedural bad
faith through the use of a negligence standard. But see Chrysler Corp. v. Lakeshore Commercial
Fin. Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1216, 1224 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (suggesting that an attorney could not be
taxed with costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 absent proof that a vexatious claim had been prompted
by counsel rather than by the client), afdmem., 549 F.2d 804 (7th Cir. 1976).
248. 447 U.S. at 766.
249. Comment, supra note 177, at 964. See also Thode, supra note 242, at 70-71 (arguing for a
higher standard of care for attorneys in malicious prosecution suits on the ground that a subjective
malice standard protects incompetent lawyers).
250. See Bird v. Rothman, 128 Ariz. 599, 627 P.2d 1097, 1101 (1981). See also Mallen, supra
note 177, at 418-19.
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attorney-client relationship. In an attempt to refute improper motive, an attor-
ney might be inclined to present evidence that his client had lied to him or that
he had filed the claim upon his client's insistence.251 This would create an
inherent conflict of interest and could cause the divulgence of privileged
communication.
252
An intermediate standard similar to the one proposed for party liti-
gants25 3 holds out the promise of the best compromise between the deterrence
and free access policies. Under this intermediate standard, which has been
termed the "intentional abuse" standard,254 a claim or procedural maneuver
would be found to have been in bad faith if the claim were objectively merit-
less and, taking into account the lawyer's expertise,255 direct or circumstantial
evidence indicated that the lawyer knew it was meritless. 256 In other words, a
court could infer bad faith if the absence of merit were so pronounced that the
attorney must have appreciated the speciousness of the claim or procedure and
deliberately proceeded with it.2 57 The attorney could rebut this presumption
with evidence that showed his good faith belief that the claim had some
validity.
258
Such a rule would not deter the attorney from prosecuting a difficult
claim, so long as the attorney could articulate reasons for belief in its merit.
Indeed, it might encourage a higher standard of care in the preparation and
prosecution of cases. It would also discourage the institution of "nuisance"
suits.
Even if courts maintain the subjective standard of bad faith for litigants,
they would be justified in applying a less restrictive standard to attorneys. At-
torneys are knowledgeable about the law and in control of most of the proce-
dural steps that are taken; therefore, they are in a better position than their
clients to be aware of the merits of their position.
259
A more difficult issue facing courts after Roadway is how the sanction of
attorneys' fees awarded to an opponent should be allocated between the of-
fending attorney and client. Prior to Roadway, most courts that awarded fees
pursuant to the bad faith exception imposed the fees only against the party
litigant for both substantive and procedural bad faith.260 In Roadway the
Court approved the imposition of attorneys' fees on attorneys for their bad
251. Comment, supra note 177, at 964.
252. See Sundby, supra note 125, at 21.
253. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text. See also Comment, supra note 177, at
967.
254. Comment, supra note 177, at 966.
255. Id at 966-67. See Driscoll v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 174, 176 (N.D. Ill.
1980) (difficulty of pleading securities matters taken into account).
256. Comment, supra note 177, at 966-97.
257. Id See also Thode, supra note 242, at 79 (arguing for a "recklessness" or "manifestly
erroneous" test for torts involving groundless litigation).
258. Comment, supra note 177, at 967.
259. Id at 963.
260. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962); Gates v. Collier, 70 F.R.D. 341
(N.D. Miss. 1976); Scheriffv. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254 (D. Colo. 1978).
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faith conduct, but did not address the issue of the clients' responsibility, if any,
for their lawyers' dilatory conduct.261 If Roadway authorizes fee awards
against attorneys for both substantive and procedural bad faith, as its language
suggests, 262 cases will certainly arise in which courts will be required to decide
who should bear the attorneys' fees imposed for bad faith conduct-the attor-
ney, the client, or both.
The few relevant cases are devoid of analysis and offer few clear conclu-
sions. In Reed v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word of Louisiana, Inc. ,263
a pre-Roadway case, attorneys' fees were imposed against a lawyer and his
clients for the filing of a frivolous civil rights action.264 Fees of $2000 were
assessed against the clients in solido for filing the frivolous claim and an addi-
tional $2000 was assessed against the attorney for making an inflammatory
speech one month before the litigation commenced, which was instrumental in
fomenting the litigation.265 In another pre-Roadway case, the court suggested
that an attorney could not be taxed with costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 absent
proof that a vexatious claim had been prompted by counsel rather than by the
client.2 6 6 In a post-Roadway case involving both substantive and procedural
bad faith, the court explicitly found bad faith on the part of both attorney and
client, but assessed fees against the client alone, reading Roadway to hold that
fees could not be assessed against the attorney.
267
In cases involving extensive or solely procedural abuse, however, courts
have been much less willing to hold clients responsible for their attorneys'
misconduct. A number of courts have stated that clients cannot be held per-
sonaUy liable for their lawyers' procedural abuses unless they were aware of or
otherwise responsible for their lawyers' actions.268 In Flora v. Moore,269 a
groundless civil rights action in which the court found extensive procedural
bad faith, fees were imposed solely against a legal services agency. The court
reasoned that liability solely against the agency was appropriate because the
clients were indigents who had left the entire litigation to their attorneys and
were personally unaware of the attorneys' vexatious misconduct. 270 In
Acevedo v. Immigration and Naturalization Service271 the court found the cli-
261. In its statement of the facts of the case, the Court noted that the lawyers had not advised
their clients that the suit was being prosecuted as a class action. 447 U.S. at 755-56. It made no
further reference to the clients' role in the lawyers' bad faith conduct.
262. See supra note 40.
263. 447 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. La. 1978).
264. Id at 320.
265. Id
266. Chrysler Corp. v. Lakeshore Commercial Fin. Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1216, 1224 (E.D. Wis.
1976), affdmem., 549 F.2d 804 (7th Cir. 1977).
267. Fisher v. Fashion Inst. of Technology, 87 F.R.D. 485, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
268. Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1089 (2d Cir.
1977). Accord Robinson v. Ritchie, 646 F.2d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1981) (remanding to district court
to determine whether plaintiff had acted in bad faith and whether plaintifi's attorney was liable
under Roadway).
269. 461 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
270. Id at 1122.
271. 538 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1976).
PUNITIVE ATTORNEYS' FEES
ent's petition for rehearing of an immigration matter to be so goundless that
her lawyer must have been aware of its lack of merit. It imposed attorneys'
fees against the attorney, citing the client's modest education as proof that she
could not have been aware of the groundlessness of her petition.
272
If a conclusion is to be drawn from this sparse authority, it is that courts
seem to focus on personal fault in allocating responsibility for an opponent's
fees between lawyer and client. Therefore, a logical starting point may be to
inquire which party, the lawyer or the client, acted in bad faith.
Normally the lawyer manages the procedural aspects of a case. The cli-
ent, being ignorant of the norm, will have little basis for evaluating the law-
yer's conduct. Indeed, the client has little opportunity to control or even
observe the procedural aspects of the case. Imposing sole responsibility for
fees against the lawyer for procedural abuses makes sense in light of the deter-
rent goal of the bad faith exception. An exception would occur when the cli-
ent has caused or participated in the abuse.
Personal fault is less clear in situations involving substantive bad faith,
however. In formulating a cause of action, the lawyer relies on the client to
relate the facts of the dispute correctly. The lawyer assesses the cause of action
and advises the client of its merits. The lawyer may be unaware of factual
misstatements or the existence of improper motives on the part of the client.
Therefore, in some instances, a lawyer will be blameless for pressing a ground-
less claim. In other cases, a lawyer may have appreciated the frivolity of a
claim, yet failed to have duly advised his client. In these cases, only the lawyer
is at fault. In many situations, both lawyer and client may realize that the
claim is groundless but decide to pursue it anyway. In these situations, both
are at fault.
A personal fault test may be logical in view of the deterrent objective of
the bad faith exception, but such a test does not bode well for the attorney-
client relationship. A test focusing on personal fault in the individual case
would give rise to an inherent conflict of interest in any case in which the bad
faith exception is raised, as both lawyer and client scramble to establish fault
on the part of the other.
One way to avoid this problem would be to establish a presumption allo-
cating responsibility for fees under the bad faith exception according to the
usual litigation circumstances that one would expect to encounter. Such a pre-
sumption would hold attorneys personally responsible for procedural bad
faith, contemplating the usual situation in which the attorney takes charge of
the procedural aspects of the case. The rule would hold the client personally
responsible for substantive or prelitigation bad faith, contemplating the usual
situation in which a client has been apprised of the weakness of his position.
273
Such a rule might fail to do justice and deter frivolous litigation in unusual
272. Id at 921.
273. A lawyer who fails to advise his client that the case is groundless might be liable under
the prior litigation exception for the attorneys' fees imposed on his client.
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situations, but it would serve to prevent protracted litigation over personal
fault and the resulting disintegration of the attorney-client relationship.
5. The Bad Faith Exception and the American Rule
Of the three punitive exceptions to the American rule designed to deter
abuses of the judicial system, the bad faith exception has the greatest potential
for deterring the broadest range of abuses. Because it is sensitive to the merits
of an action or practice, it also has the greatest potential for offending the
judicial system's interest in fostering free access to the courts. The struggle to
formulate and apply standards for determining bad faith reflects the courts'
desire to protect the judicial system without sacrificing its accessibility to those
who may present meritorious actions. In formulating standards to deter the
unnecessary and groundless case or practice without deterring the meritorious,
courts should be more circumspect in applying the bad faith exception to preli-
tigation conduct and more aggressive in applying the exception to the asser-
tion of groundless claims.
The normal objections to fee shifting-increased time burdens on courts,
remoteness of the injury, and threat to independent advocacy-are not com-
pelling when one of the litigants has acted in bad faith. When a litigant has
wrongfully caused or extended litigation, the additional expenditures incurred
by the opposing party to meet the bad faith endeavor are a highly foreseeable
result. Courts will be forced to expend time to hear the fee motion, determine
bad faith, and compute the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees, but this addi-
tional burden is outweighed by the important objective of preserving the integ-
rity of the judicial process. The bad faith exception does not pose a threat to
independent advocacy. The party seeking to apply the bad faith exception
normally must have prevailed on the merits under the prelitigation and sub-
stantive branches of the exception, so there will be no division of loyalties on
the part of counsel in these situations. Although one need not have prevailed
on the merits for recovery of fees for procedural bad faith, the courts' interest
and the partys' interest will be the same: to punish, deter, and compensate for
the additional burdens caused by the abuses of the opposing party.
III. CONCLUSION
One of the greatest challenges facing courts in an increasingly litigious
society is to allocate fairly their finite resources in order to preserve the author-
ity and effectiveness of the judicial system. In meeting this challenge, it is
within the inherent power of the courts to design doctrines that discourage the
institution of the cases that constitute an unwarranted use of their resources.
The use of doctrines providing for the recovery of attorneys' fees provides a
valuable means of controlling the use of'judicial resources by encouraging cir-
cumspection on the part of those who contemplate using the courts and volun-
tary compliance with the substantive law.
Awarding attorneys' fees under the contempt exception, for example, en-
courages private individuals to play an instrumental role in the enforcement of
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the law and the preservation of the authority of the courts. The prior litigation
exception indirectly protects judicial resources by deterring conduct that has a
high probability of exposing an innocent person to litigation. The bad faith
exception directly discourages misuse of judicial resources by imposing sanc-
tions on those who engage in abusive litigation or litigation practices. The
factor that unifies all of these exceptions is that they promote the preservation
of judicial authority, integrity, and efficiency.

